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ARTICLE 
HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IS MADE:  
THE CASE OF THE GOLDEN LEASH 
MATTHEW D. CAIN† 
JILL E. FISCH†† 
SEAN J. GRIFFITH††† 
STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON†††† 
This Article presents a case study of a corporate governance innovation: the 
incentive compensation arrangement for activist-nominated director candidates 
colloquially known as the “golden leash.” Golden leash compensation arrangements 
are a potentially valuable tool for activist shareholders in election contests. In response 
to their use, a number of issuers adopted bylaw provisions banning incentive 
compensation arrangements. Investors, in turn, viewed director adoption of golden 
leash bylaws as problematic and successfully pressured issuers to repeal them. 
This study demonstrates how corporate governance provisions are developed and 
deployed, the sequential responses of issuers and investors, and the central role played 
by governance intermediaries—activist investors, institutional advisors, and 
corporate law firms. 
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The golden leash also presents an opportunity to test the response of share prices 
to governance innovation. We conducted two cross-sectional event studies around key 
dates that affected the availability of the golden leash. Our core finding is that share 
prices of firms facing activist intervention reacted positively to events that make 
golden leashes more available and negatively to events that make golden leashes less 
available. Moreover, we found that this governance innovation did not affect every 
firm in an identical manner. Only the share prices of those firms most likely to be 
subject to activist attention experienced statistically significant share price reactions. 
Our research contributes to the debate over how corporate governance is made 
and its economic significance. Although we found that corporate governance 
provisions may be priced, at least in some circumstances, our study also suggests that 
corporate governance is a complex story involving the actions and reactions not merely 
of the firm and its shareholders but of a variety of intermediaries and interest groups 
that have agendas of their own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How is corporate governance made? In one telling, corporate governance 
is endogenous and closely tailored to firm-specific needs.1 Companies adopt 
those governance provisions that are designed to create the greatest value 
given the firm’s particular situation.2 Alternatively, governance mechanisms 
may be adopted by or imposed upon firms without regard to firm value in 
order to insulate self-interested executives or directors, or to respond to 
interest group pressures.3 Between these two poles lies a spectrum of other 
tales about corporate governance and its impact on firm value. And yet, in 
spite of the persistent disagreement surrounding these accounts, there is an 
increasing emphasis on adherence to the “right” governance principles 
espoused by activist hedge funds and institutional investors, even though 
these principles are often unproven and difficult to evaluate empirically.4 
We use a case study of a corporate governance innovation—the golden 
leash—to shed light on how corporate governance originates and how it is 
valued. Activist hedge funds invented the golden leash as a tool for attracting 
and incentivizing director candidates in a proxy contest. Under the terms of 
the golden leash, these hedge funds agreed to pay their director nominees 
millions of dollars if the nominees were successful both in winning board 
seats and achieving the hedge fund’s desired objectives. 
The golden leash burst onto the scene in 20125 when JANA Partners, LLC 
(JANA) offered to pay its nominees to the board of Agrium, Inc. (Agrium) an 
 
1 See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). 
2 Id. 
3 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd–Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 
95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1786 (2011) (maintaining that Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Act in a 
hasty reaction to the events of the 2008 financial crisis without properly assessing its impact); 
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE 
L.J. 1521, 1585 (2005) (arguing that Congress enacted the Sarbanes–Oxley governance mandates as a 
result of political pressure and without adequately evaluating their efficiency). 
4 See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Lack of Consensus on Corporate Governance, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/business/a-lack-of-consensus-on-
corporate-governance.html [http://perma.cc/BUZ6-ZW72] (criticizing institutional investors for 
“advocating whatever the conventional wisdom of the moment says is good corporate governance”). 
5 JANA first entered into a golden leash compensation agreement in 2007 in connection with the 
2008 annual meeting at CNET Networks and JANA’s attempt to elect a number of dissident directors 
to the CNET board. See Letter Agreement Between Jon Miller and JANA Partners (Dec. 23, 2007), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1015577/000090266408000019/p07-1802exh_7.txt [http://pe
rma.cc/QPS3-9ATL]. JANA disclosed the compensation agreement in the proxy materials that it 
filed with the SEC, but the agreement did not receive any public attention and became moot when 
CNET decided to sell itself before the culmination of the proxy contest. See CBS–CNET Deal is Good 
News for JANA, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 16, 2008), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/05/16/cb
s-cnet-deal-is-good-news-for-jana [http://perma.cc/38QB-A4QN]; see also JANA Master Fund, Ltd. 
652 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 649 
additional $50,000 each, if elected, plus a collective total of 2.6% of JANA’s net 
gain on the investment.6 Around the same time, Elliott Management (Elliott) 
agreed to pay its dissident nominees to the Hess Corp. (Hess) board an 
additional $30,000, if elected, for each percentage point by which Hess 
outperformed its peers over a three-year period.7 These pay arrangements offered 
potential compensation in the millions to be paid directly by the activists to their 
nominees. As such, the arrangements had the potential to tie the interests of 
the nominees, once elected, to the activists that had nominated them. 
Accordingly, opponents of the arrangements dubbed them “golden leashes.”8 
The golden leash was immediately controversial. JANA and Elliott 
justified the golden leash by the need, first, to get the right people onto their 
slates and, second, to incentivize those people, once elected, to push the 
company to outperform.9 According to this account, golden leashes empower 
shareholders by providing directors committed to unlocking hidden value and 
increasing market returns. Critics of the golden leash, however, derided these 
arrangements as pernicious innovations that merely emboldened those who 
would “jeopardize a company’s ability to generate sustainable long-term 
returns” and “destroy jobs.”10 
Opponents of activist shareholders soon responded with an innovation of 
their own. On May 10, 2013, Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & 
Katz (Wachtell), a prominent law firm known for defending firms against 
activist interventions and hostile takeovers, issued a public memorandum 
recommending that corporations adopt bylaws prohibiting golden leash 
compensation arrangements (the “Wachtell Bylaw”).11 In relatively short 
 
v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 337, 339-40 (Del. Ch. 2008) (describing JANA’s intended proxy 
contest and holding that CNET could not block the contest by invoking its advance-notice bylaw). 
6 See infra notes 83–92 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
8 To our knowledge, Agrium’s Board Chair, Victor J. Zaleschuk, was the first to use the term 
“golden leash” to describe these compensation arrangements. See Press Release, Agrium, Agrium 
Urges Shareholders to Vote the White Proxy for Agrium’s Director Nominees (Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://www.agrium.com/en/investors/news-releases/2013/agrium-urges-shareholders-vote-white-pr
oxy-agriums-director-nominees [http://perma.cc/687W-ASVQ]; see also David Benoit & Joann S. 
Lublin, ‘Golden Leash’ Payments Fuel Debate, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052702304281004579220094112755708 [http://perma.cc/X32N-QNHA] (calling 
the “golden leash” issue one of the “hottest topics in corporate governance”). 
9 See infra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. 
10 Martin Lipton, The Threat to Shareholders and the Economy from Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 14, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2015/01/14/the-threat-to-shareholders-and-the-economy-from-activist-hedge-funds [http://perma.cc/ 
EV24-2F7C] (quoting Laurence Fink, CEO of Blackrock). 
11 Martin Lipton, Bylaw Protection Against Dissident Director Conflict/Enrichment Schemes, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 10, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard. 
edu/2013/05/10/bylaw-protection-against-dissident-director-conflictenrichment-schemes [http://perma. 
cc/N3MT-WVX4]. 
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order, more than thirty public companies adopted the Wachtell Bylaw.12 
Moreover, because it could be adopted by any company virtually overnight, 
the Wachtell Bylaw had a market-wide effect.13 
The Wachtell Bylaw was challenged, but not in any court of law.14 Instead, 
it provoked the wrath of a prominent proxy advisory firm, Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS). On November 12, 2013, ISS recommended that 
shareholders withhold their votes from directors at Provident Financial 
Holdings, Inc. (Provident) because the bank had adopted the Wachtell 
Bylaw.15 At the subsequent annual meeting, Provident’s director nominees 
received a substantial number of withhold votes, and ISS threatened more 
withhold recommendations, publishing a list of other firms that had adopted 
the Wachtell Bylaw.16 
Corporate America got the message. By May 20, 2014, twenty-eight of the 
thirty-two companies known to have adopted the Wachtell Bylaw prior to the 
Provident meeting had removed it in whole or in part.17 The golden leash, in 
contrast, is far from dead: it has been used in several recent activist attacks, 
notably those involving Dow Chemical (Dow) and General Motors.18 In 
November 2014, Dow agreed to seat two Third Point, LLC (Third Point) 
 
12 See CHRIS CERNICH ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., WHEELING OUT 
THE PROCRUSTEAN BED: BYLAW RESTRICTIONS ON DISSIDENT NOMINEE COMPENSATION 1 
(2013), http://www.thedeal.com/first_word/Wheeling_Out_the_Procrustean_Bed_-_Bylaw_Restric 
tions_on_Dissident_Nominee_Compensation-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/D46B-RGLH]. This figure is 
as of the date of the Provident meeting discussed infra Section II.B, and excludes bylaw amendments 
adopted by spinoff companies. See infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
13 Essentially, every company has the power to adopt the bylaw at any time unless it made a 
binding commitment not to do so. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2015). 
14 To date, no court has issued an opinion evaluating the legality of golden leash compensation 
arrangements or bylaws prohibiting their use. 
15 The withhold recommendation was a direct response to the adoption of the Wachtell Bylaw. 
As ISS explained, “ISS recommended ‘withhold’ votes for the election of the members of [Provident 
Bank’s] nominating committee because its board adopted—without shareholder approval—a 
corporate bylaw that barred director nominees from accepting compensation from anyone other than 
the company during their candidacy or service as a board member.” JONES DAY, GOVERNANCE 
PERSPECTIVES: ISS QUESTIONS DIRECTOR COMPENSATION BYLAW (2013), http://www.jones
day.com/files/Publication/e38a7775-2224-4d95-b2bf-c25e51340098/Presentation/PublicationAttachmen
t/e006df6f-96eb-4b41-9ddf-c6fb0696d82d/GP-ISS%20Questions%20Director%20Compensation%
20Bylaw.pdf [http://perma.cc/BW5R-N9LQ]. 
16 See CERNICH ET AL., supra note 12, at 2. 
17 See infra Table I and accompanying text. 
18 For a description of the compensation arrangement in the GM activist intervention, see 
Press Release, Gen. Motors, GM Statement Regarding Receipt of Director Notice and Shareholder 
Proposal from Harry J. Wilson (Feb. 10, 2015), http://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/news.detail. 
html/content/Pages/news/us/en/2015/feb/0210-corp.html [http://perma.cc/T8PB-5H2W] (describing 
Wilson as “indicat[ing] a fee arrangement under which [the activist group’s nominee] will receive a 
percentage of the group’s profits from their investment in GM”). On Third Point’s use of a golden 
leash arrangement in its attack on Dow, see Benoit & Lublin, supra note 8. 
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nominees who became the first directors to be compensated pursuant to a 
golden leash.19 
The back and forth on the golden leash and the Wachtell Bylaw provides 
a case study of how corporate governance originates and is tested by the 
marketplace. The golden leash shows that corporate governance in many cases 
is a product of “governance intermediaries,” each with its own agenda and 
interests.20 Activist hedge funds may have invented the golden leash, but the 
shape of the governance arrangements that ultimately emerged has as much 
to do with the counseling of a corporate law firm and the advocacy of an 
institutional proxy advisor as it does with the activists themselves. The 
success or failure of a governance innovation may often depend upon the 
position taken by such intermediaries. 
While intermediaries may introduce these provisions, the question 
remains whether they are beneficial to the companies adopting them. With 
respect to the golden leash, this can be studied empirically. We did so by first 
examining each company and the circumstances of its adoption and repeal of 
the golden leash bylaw. We found that while some firms were reacting directly 
to activist threats, others had no apparent rationale for adopting the Wachtell 
Bylaw.21 Second, if the golden leash is economically good or bad, one would 
expect to see stock price reactions—either positive or negative—in response to 
firms’ adoption and repeal of the Wachtell Bylaw. We therefore ran a time series 
analysis to determine how the market reacted to firms’ adoption and repeal 
of the new corporate governance terms. We found no statistically significant 
share price effect for those companies that adopted—and subsequently 
repealed—the Wachtell Bylaw.22 
 
19 See David Benoit, Proxy Adviser ISS Blesses Pay for Activist’s Directors at Dow, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/proxy-adviser-iss-blesses-pay-for-activists-directors-at-
dow-1429725478 [http://perma.cc/QL6M-9ZPS] (describing ISS’s “cautious” approval of the 
compensation arrangement for the Third Point directors); see also Dow Chem. Co., Soliciting 
Material Pursuant to § 240.14a-12 (Schedule 14A) (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/29915/000119312514411302/d820869ddfan14a.htm [https://perma.cc/RJ6L-VNR4] (describing 
the nominees’ compensation agreement as tied to the appreciation of Third Point’s shares). 
Shareholders elected the negotiated slate of director candidates in May 2015. Press Release, Dow 
Chem. Co., Dow Announces Results from Annual Stockholder Meeting (May 14, 2015), http:// 
www.dow.com/news/press-releases/dow%20announces%20results%20from%20annual%20stockholder% 
20meeting%20may%202015 [http://perma.cc/QDV5-XENP]. 
20 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013) (describing 
activist hedge funds as “governance intermediaries” whose role is “to monitor company performance 
and then to present to companies and institutional shareholders concrete proposals for business 
strategy through mechanisms less drastic than takeovers”). 
21 See infra Section III.B. 
22 See infra Section III.C. 
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We then looked further. Because a golden leash bylaw can be adopted 
unilaterally at any time by the board of directors, we posited that what matters 
is not the actual adoption of the bylaw but rather the bylaw’s availability for 
adoption if and when the board decides that it is needed. Additionally, we 
reasoned that the availability of a golden leash may not matter for all 
companies, but only for those that face the imminent prospect of a proxy 
contest or other activist intervention. 
We examined this possibility by looking at the companies that 
experienced shareholder activism during the period from one year prior to 
the Wachtell Memorandum to one year after the Provident annual meeting. 
We assumed market discrimination in pricing corporate governance terms 
and hypothesized that we would find a share price reaction to the Wachtell 
Memorandum in this subset of companies. Our results are consistent with 
our hypothesis. We found a statistically significant decline in the share price 
of “targeted firms” on the release of the Wachtell Memorandum and a 
statistically significant increase in share price after the Provident vote. 
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, these price effects were limited to 
those companies most affected by the governance innovation in question—that 
is, those companies most likely to experience activism. Companies not subject 
to activist intervention had no statistically significant share price reactions. 
Our findings contain several important implications for corporate 
governance. First, they provide evidence that intermediaries play an 
important role in channeling corporate governance innovation. Second, they 
show that, at least in this case, corporate governance may be priced by the 
market. Although our results suggest that investors responded to developments 
regarding the golden leash, we note that the value assigned by the market may 
not reflect the economic value of the leash itself, but may instead indicate 
more general investor or market anticipation of potential activist 
intervention. Third, our empirical findings provide evidence that investor 
reactions may be based largely on salience, and governance intermediaries 
play a critical role in creating this salience. 
Ultimately, our findings are cause for caution regarding what constitutes 
“good” corporate governance and how studies of governance are conducted. 
While our case study examines only one event, it offers reasons to question 
the relationship between short-term share price reactions and long-term 
economic value. More generally, the evolution of corporate governance 
innovations is a complex story involving the actions and reactions not merely 
of the firm and its shareholders, but of a variety of intermediaries and interest 
groups with their own agendas. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews the academic debate over 
how corporate governance is made and what value it adds. Part II presents 
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our case study of the golden leash. Part III reports the results of our empirical 
tests. Part IV considers the implications of our findings for corporate 
governance scholarship. Part V closes with a brief summary and conclusion. 
I. THE MAKING OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Much of the literature on the creation of corporate governance is 
premised on a contractarian model of the firm, according to which governance 
mechanisms reflect the terms of a bargain struck between investors and 
managers.23 Although public company shareholders and managers typically 
do not meet at a bargaining table, corporate governance can nevertheless be 
modeled as the product of an investor–manager bargain, provided that 
governance terms are priced in the capital market.24 Understanding that 
investors are willing to pay more for favorable governance structures, 
managers have an incentive to adopt these structures in order to lower the 
company’s cost of capital.25 Investors, for their part, get the governance they 
pay for. Much of the prior work on the production of corporate governance 
therefore focuses centrally on the question of whether governance terms are 
priced. Section I.A, below, reviews this literature. 
But whether governance terms are priced is only half of the story. 
Answering this question does not reveal how governance terms are made or 
the considerations that ultimately factor into the pricing of corporate 
governance. To answer the question of how corporate governance is made, the 
roles of various institutional actors with a stake in corporate governance must 
be considered. These capital market intermediaries—activists, corporate law 
firms, and proxy advisors—have an important role to play in making 
corporate governance. Section I.B, below, examines how these intermediaries 
interact to create corporate governance reform. 
A. Which Governance Terms Are Adopted? 
According to mainstream corporate law theory, firms adopt governance 
terms to maximize firm value, implying that governance terms have value and 
 
23 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 15 (stating that “corporate law should 
contain the terms people would have negotiated” and that it “almost always conforms to this model”). 
24 See id. at 17 (“All the terms in corporate governance are contractual in the sense that they 
are fully priced in transactions among the interested parties. They are thereafter tested for desirable 
properties; the firms that pick the wrong terms will fail in competition with other firms competing 
for capital.”). 
25 See id. at 6 (“[S]elf-interested entrepreneurs and managers, just like other investors, are 
driven to find the devices most likely to maximize net profits. If they do not, they pay for their 
mistakes because they receive lower prices for corporate paper.”). 
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that they are priced by the market.26 Corporate governance research has 
therefore focused on the empirical question of whether and how particular 
governance terms are priced as a necessary first step in answering whether 
particular governance provisions are good or bad. Unfortunately, whether and 
how the market prices corporate governance remains subject to dispute, as a 
review of the recent literature shows. 
Studies have shown that some governance provisions that weaken 
shareholder rights and insulate managers from challenge are negatively correlated 
with firm value. For example, publicly traded shares of firms with a controlling 
shareholder trade at a so-called “minority discount.”27 Because minority shares 
in a controlled corporation lack the ability to influence the management of 
the firm, they trade at a discount relative to other shares.28 Moreover, studies 
have found a negative relationship between staggered board provisions and 
share price, suggesting that obstacles to a change of control have a negative 
effect on firm value.29 Likewise, studies have found a negative relationship 
between the adoption of state antitakeover statutes and stock price.30 
In a similar vein, a line of studies has attempted to quantify a firm’s overall 
corporate governance package by constructing indices of good corporate 
governance and comparing the performance of firms with different ratings 
according to the index. The first such study—by Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick—incorporated twenty-four governance terms into a “Governance 
Index” and found that firms that were more protective of shareholder rights 
significantly outperformed those with fewer shareholder protections throughout 
the 1990s.31 Building on this study, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell narrowed the 
Governance Index to a six-factor “Entrenchment Index” and found that high 
scores for entrenchment were negatively associated with firm value.32 
Meanwhile, Brown and Caylor built a broader index that included a number 
 
26 See, e.g., Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 1325, 1327 (2013) (explaining that, under the contractarian model, “market forces would lead 
the parties to create governance arrangements and adopt legal rules that would minimize agency 
costs and thereby maximize firm value”). 
27 Michael J. Barclay & Clifford G. Holderness, Private Benefits from Control of Public 
Corporations, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 372 (1989). 
28 John C. Coates IV, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in 
Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1262 (1999). 
29 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 
409, 418-30 (2005); Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 783, 804-05 (2009). 
30 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Second-Generation 
State Takeover Legislation, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 308-20 (1989). 
31 Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003). 
32 Bebchuk et al., supra note 29, at 788-90; accord K. J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, 
Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices, 60 J. FIN. 2859, 2871-78 (2005) (focusing on the 
relationship between corporate governance terms and the market for corporate control). 
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of variables not included in other indices, such as compensation practices, 
independence, and meeting attendance, and found that their index was 
correlated with firm value.33 
Other studies, however, have produced inconsistent results concerning the 
price effects of corporate governance variables. Black and Bhagat, for 
example, extensively studied board independence and found no correlation 
between independence and price,34 a result that Hermalin and Weisbach 
confirmed in a review of a broader sample of the literature.35 Other studies 
have found no universal, statistically significant wealth effects of poison pill 
adoptions36 and at least one study found a significant increase in share value 
attributable to poison pills in some circumstances.37 Moreover, recent work 
by Cremers, Litov, and Sepe challenges the conclusion that staggered boards 
have uniformly negative wealth effects.38 Instead, using time series analysis, 
they find that staggered board provisions appear to contribute share value for 
firms where a commitment to long-term value is more important—specifically, 
more complex firms with greater research and development and more 
intangible assets.39 Further, staggered boards do not seem to be priced in the 
IPO market.40 Meanwhile, the share price effect of the corporate governance 
 
33 Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation, 25 J. 
ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 428-29 (2006). 
34 Bernard Black & Sanjai Bhagat, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-
Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 262-63 (2002). 
35 Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously 
Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., 
Apr. 2003, at 7, 12. 
36 See, e.g., James A. Brickley et al., Outside Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills, 35 J. FIN. 
ECON. 371, 388 (1994) (“[T]he average stock-price reaction to the announcement of the adoption of 
a poison pill is positive and significant when outside directors comprise a majority of the board and 
negative and significant when they do not.”); Sudip Datta & Mai Iskandar-Datta, Takeover Defenses 
and Wealth Effects on Security Holders: The Case of Poison Pill Adoptions, 20 J. BANKING & FIN. 1231, 
1232-33 (1996) (“[T]he impact [of the announcement of adoption of a poison pill] on stockholders is 
insignificant.”); Wallace N. Davidson III et al., The Importance of Board Composition and Committee 
Structure: The Case of Poison Pills, 1 CORP. OWNERSHIP & CONTROL, Spring 2004, at 81, 81-82 
(“[W]hether poison-pill adoption hurts or benefits shareholders may be situationally dependent.”). 
37 Gary L. Caton & Jeremy Goh, Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights, and Shareholder 
Rights Plans: Poison, Placebo, or Prescription?, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 381, 390 (2008). 
38 K. J. Martijn Cremers et al., Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited 3 (July 14, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364165 [http://perma.cc/Y6K9-QXWM]. 
39 Id. at 7; accord Seoungpil Ahn & Keshab Shrestha, The Differential Effects of Classified Boards 
on Firm Value, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3993, 4011 (2013) (finding that in complex firms the benefits of 
staggered boards may outweigh the costs). 
40 Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover 
Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 107 (2001). 
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indices appears to have disappeared, a fact that has recently been acknowledged 
by several of the authors who constructed the original indices.41 
This diversity of results could be due in part to the well-known 
methodological problems associated with measuring the wealth effects of 
corporate governance terms. Principal among these is the endogeneity 
problem—the difficulty of separating the propensity of bad firms to select a 
particular corporate governance term from the bad effects of the term itself.42 
Moreover, the negative effect when bad companies adopt staggered boards 
for entrenchment reasons may swamp the positive effect that staggered 
boards provide to good companies as a commitment device.43 Another 
complication is that some provisions may have market-wide effects depending 
upon the mechanisms of adoption. To the extent that a governance term can be 
adopted through unilateral board action—such as a bylaw amendment or a 
poison pill—whether a company actually adopts the provision is unimportant 
in light of the provision’s availability for adoption at any moment.44 In such 
cases, only corporate acts credibly opting out of such provisions should have 
any effect on price.45 Event studies may be particularly useful in such 
situations.46 We therefore turn to this technique in Part III below. 
 
41 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance 
and Returns, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 324 (2013). 
42 See, e.g., Renée B. Adams et al., The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A 
Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 58, 59 (2010) (highlighting the 
endogeneity problem in corporate governance); Matthew D. Cain et al., Do Takeover Laws Matter? 
Evidence from Five Decades of Hostile Takeovers 19 (July 21, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2517513 [http://perma.cc/72NC-D3PF] (discussing endogeneity issues in 
prior studies of corporate governance). 
43 See Cremers et al., supra note 38, at 29-30 (explaining that although the traditional view is 
that staggered boards are used to entrench management, for firms where longer-term commitments 
are relevant, the adoption of a staggered board is associated with an increase in firm value). 
44 See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the 
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 277-78 (2000) (noting that because “every firm has a ‘shadow 
pill[,]’ . . . adoption of an actual pill has no effect on a target’s legal takeover”); accord Emiliano M. 
Catan, The Irrelevance of Active Poison Pills (Nov. 14, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (analyzing poison pill adoptions and renewals and finding no discernible economic effect). 
45 It may be that opting in signals an underlying firm characteristic to which the market reacts, 
but in this case the price effect is caused by the firm characteristic signaled by the governance 
arrangement, not the governance arrangement itself. For example, the decision to adopt majority 
voting may be a signal of a better-governed firm, leading the market to react favorably to firms that 
adopt majority voting independent of whether a majority voting rule adds firm value. See Stephen 
J. Choi et al., Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016) (exploring the extent to which different behavior by firms adopting majority voting is 
explained by a selection effect). 
46 See, e.g., Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder 
Value? Evidence From a Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 627 (2013) (analyzing share price 
reactions to two important Delaware court decisions affecting the stringency of antitakeover provisions). 
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B. How Does Corporate Governance Change? 
Just as the question of what governance terms are adopted implicates 
whether the market prices such terms, the question of how corporate governance 
changes are made depends largely on the institutional intermediaries. The 
conventional contractarian account of corporate governance is premised on 
disintermediated capital markets through which shareholders exert influence 
on corporate governance through their buy and sell decisions.47 Even this 
model, however, reserves a place for investment bank underwriters and other 
capital market intermediaries in determining the allocation of governance 
rights when the firm seeks outside capital.48 But how does corporate 
governance change once this initial allocation is set?49 Which actors push 
firms to adopt new governance terms? Recent literature has considered the 
distinctive role played by intermediaries, focusing principally on institutional 
investors and hedge fund activists.50 
Institutional intermediaries are especially important now that the 
disintermediated capital market, on which the original contractarian account 
is premised, has disappeared. Today, a substantial percentage of U.S. equity 
is held by institutional investors.51 Many institutions are long-term investors 
who hold the market through index funds, exchange-traded funds, and other 
broadly diversified investment vehicles. They do not, typically, move into and 
out of a stock based on corporate governance. This is not to say that 
institutional investors are indifferent to corporate governance, especially in 
their voting decisions.52 They are, however, subject to significant resource 
 
47 See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. The collective pressure of shareholders’ 
investment decisions triggers managers to adopt governance terms consistent with shareholder interests. 
“It is almost as if there were an invisible hand.” EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 4. 
48 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 293. 
49 See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 26, at 1346 (distinguishing mid-stream governance changes 
from the treatment of governance provisions at the initial public offering stage). 
50 See, e.g., Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 909, 914 (2013) (arguing that changes in the legal regime governing pension funds 
has shifted U.S. corporate governance toward a shareholder primacy norm). 
51 See BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR. & STEPHEN DAVIS, MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & PERFORMANCE, ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS PART OF THE PROBLEM OR 
PART OF THE SOLUTION?: KEY DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT 
SHAREHOLDERS’ ROLE IN U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKETS 1 (2011), http://web.law.columbia.edu/ 
sites/default/files/microsites/millstein-center/80235_CED_WEB.pdf [http://perma.cc/G58Q-3ZYW]. 
52 See Stephen Choi et al., Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections, 3 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 35, 37-38 (2013) (exploring the voting behavior of mutual funds); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
1277, 1317–28 (1991) (noting that institutional investors have “limited interest in corporate governance 
issues . . . because the expected gains from most such governance issues are small, deferred, and 
received by investors, while the costs are potentially large, immediate, and borne by money 
managers”); Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive 
Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 354 (2009) (“Institutional investors, despite having greater 
2016] The Case of the Golden Leash 661 
constraints, which often lead them to follow shortcuts and heuristics in 
deciding how to vote on corporate governance issues.53 
In a market dominated by largely passive and resource-constrained 
institutional investors, third-party intermediaries play a large role in 
manufacturing and modifying corporate governance terms. Gilson and Gordon 
have modeled activist hedge funds as one such third-party intermediary.54 In 
their account, activists function as arbitrageurs of undervalued governance 
rights, creating value not by taking over the firm, but by persuading 
institutional investors to support their position and, if necessary, their slate 
of nominees.55 Activists thus function as governance intermediaries, bringing 
governance change by mobilizing the institutional investor constituency.  
Activists are not the only important intermediaries when it comes to 
corporate governance reform. Indeed, the story of the golden leash 
demonstrates that, in addition to activists, proxy advisors and corporate law 
firms may perform an equally important role as governance intermediaries. 
The dominant proxy advisory firm is ISS.56 Like activists, proxy advisors 
exert influence by mobilizing institutional investors. Unlike activists, proxy 
advisors have no ownership stake in the recommendations they make. Instead, 
proxy advisors provide company-specific research and voting recommendations 
to institutional investor clients, effectively allowing institutions to outsource 
much of their portfolio monitoring function.57 In connection with these services, 
proxy advisory firms communicate corporate governance policy positions and 
viewpoints to their institutional investor clients. ISS’s policies have significant 
 
capacity to monitor and gather information, may have too small a stake in a company or too limited 
industry expertise to monitor it actively.”); Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual 
Fund Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 845-46 (2009) (“[T]he greater 
the dependency of [mutual fund advisers] upon [corporate clients] for asset management business, 
the less likely the fund family will be to support shareholder-sponsored governance resolutions.”). 
53 See Choi et al., supra note 52, at 50-55. 
54 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 20, at 901. 
55 Id. at 897. 
56 See JAMES R. COPLAND, MANHATTAN INST. CTR. FOR LEGAL POL’Y, PROXY MONITOR 
2012: A REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 3 (2012), 
http://www.proxymonitor.org/pdf/pmr_04.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y7XX-H6KK]. The other major 
proxy advisory firm is Glass Lewis. See id. at 23. 
57 Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869,  
870-71 (2010). 
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influence on investors’ voting behavior.58 As a result, proxy advisors have been 
subject to substantial criticism and even calls for regulatory oversight.59 
Institutional investors do not treat every recommendation of proxy advisory 
firms with equal regard. Proxy advisors have adopted elaborate voting policies 
with regard to a great many corporate and social issues.60 These policy positions 
often take the form of market-wide pronouncements on a particular issue, 
such as the ISS pronouncement on the Wachtell Bylaw.61 Institutional investors 
may disagree with the basis underlying a proxy advisor’s recommendation—
as they often do, for example, in the context of withhold recommendations in 
director elections—in which case the recommendation will have little or no 
effect on voting outcomes.62 On other issues, however, the proxy advisor’s 
recommendation is largely outcome determinative.63 
In addition to discussing activists, institutional investors, and their 
advisors, our account illuminates the intermediary role played by corporate 
law firms. The legal literature customarily treats lawyers as advocates or 
counselors in particular cases or controversies, but some prominent law firms 
play an important policy role as well. In the corporate law context, this is 
especially true of Wachtell, which has a specific set of clients with an 
identifiable perspective—acquisition targets and boards subject to unwelcome 
attention from shareholder activists. Wachtell is particularly well-known for 
inventing the poison pill and thereby fundamentally changing the tactics of 
 
58 See Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389, 2401 (2009) (finding negative ISS 
recommendation reduced votes “FOR” the election of a director nominee by approximately twenty 
percent); Choi et al., supra note 57, at 906 (“[W]e find that the impact of an ISS recommendation ranges 
from 6% to 13% for the median company.”); James Cotter et al., ISS Recommendations and Mutual 
Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 55 (2010) (finding that institutions “voted in line with 
ISS recommendations much more frequently than with contrary management recommendations”). 
59 See, e.g., SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (June 30, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/ 
cfslb20.htm [https://perma.cc/SL2N-F69N]. 
60 See, e.g., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., 2014 U.S. PROXY VOTING SUMMARY 
GUIDELINES (2014). 
61 See infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. By contrast, ISS at other times issues research 
recommendations with regard to a shareholder vote at a particular company. See, e.g., CHRIS 
CERNICH & NELSON SERACI, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., ALLERGAN (AGN)—
CONSENT SOLICITATION BY PERSHING SQUARE TO CALL A SPECIAL MEETING 2 (2014), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2014/09/iss-comparables.pdf [http://perma.cc/F6AD-
RNLM] (detailing ISS’s recommendation with respect to a special meeting at Allergan). 
62 See, e.g., Yonca Ertimur et al., Understanding Uncontested Director Elections: Determinants 
and Consequences 3 (June 9, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id-2447920 [http://perma.cc/SH44-M46X] (finding significant variation in voting outcomes 
when ISS makes a withhold recommendation and relating that variation to shareholder consideration 
of the rationale underlying the recommendation). 
63 See Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical 
Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 582-83 (2015) (finding that an ISS 
recommendation for or against an acquisition transaction can influence approximately 15% to 23% of 
the shareholder vote on a merger). 
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hostile takeovers and defenses.64 But the firm is also influential through its 
regular publication of public “client memos.”65 
It was one such memorandum that led nearly three dozen firms to adopt 
the Wachtell Bylaw in short order.66 Like the poison pill, the Wachtell Bylaw 
could be adopted at any time through unilateral board action. Thus, like the 
poison pill, the potential availability of the Bylaw had a market-wide effect 
that was not limited to actual adopters.67 
Wachtell and other similar law firms clearly exert a role in corporate 
governance beyond the advising of individual clients in discrete circumstances. 
They are, like proxy advisors and activist investors, governance intermediaries. 
Unlike proxy advisors and activist investors, however, law firms exert their 
governance leverage primarily on corporations and corporate boards rather 
than institutional investors. 
With Part I having reviewed the literature on each of these intermediary 
roles in the adoption of corporate governance terms, the next Part turns to a 
case study of this process in action. 
II. THE CASE OF THE GOLDEN LEASH 
A. Background 
The golden leash has its roots in the evolution of hedge fund activism in 
the United States. In the 1970s and 1980s, hostile control contests typically 
involved an attempt by an acquirer to purchase an entire company.68 Legal 
innovations such as the poison pill as well as economic developments that 
increased the cost of financing takeovers shifted takeover strategy to the 
proxy contest.69 At first, activists ran full slate proxy contests in which they 
 
64 Name Partner Martin Lipton typically receives credit for the invention. See, e.g., Martin M. 
Cohen, Note, “Poison Pills” as a Negotiating Tool: Seeking a Cease-Fire in the Corporate Takeover Wars, 
1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 459, 460 n.3. 
65 For example, in a set of famous memoranda from the height of the hostile takeover era, the 
firm threatened to advise clients to reincorporate out of Delaware if the state did not allow boards 
to employ takeover defenses. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1931, 1959 & n.95 (1991) (quoting memoranda issued by Wachtell asserting that in light of 
recent Delaware court decisions it may be necessary for corporations to “leav[e] Delaware for a more 
hospitable state of incorporation” and suggesting that it may be “time to migrate out of Delaware”). 
66 See infra Section III.C. 
67 See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
68 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176-77 (Del. 
1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949-50 (Del. 1985). 
69 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 491, 503-07 (2001) (explaining that the widespread use and validation of the poison pill 
shifted unsolicited takeover attempts to proxy contests coupled with tender offers); Joseph A. 
Grundfest, Just Say No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. 
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sought to obtain control of the target company by replacing all or a majority 
of the board of directors.70 However, as further innovation in takeover 
protection took root, most notably the poison pill–staggered board 
combination, activists gradually shifted to partial slate elections.71 Partial slate 
elections, in which the activist does not seek control but merely 
representation on the board, typically in the form of two to four seats, have 
now largely replaced control contests.72 
There were several possible reasons for this shift. One was regulatory: in 
1992, the SEC revised the federal proxy rules to allow shareholders to run a 
short slate election contest.73 Another was increased support by shareholders 
for short slate contests. The short slate election strategy offers activists the 
opportunity to take their proposal for change into the boardroom and enables 
their directors, if elected, to persuade the rest of the board to embrace the 
activist agenda. At the same time, institutional investors and their advisors 
seem to view short slate contests as presenting less of a threat of 
destabilization than replacing the entire board.74 In addition, the incumbent 
directors operate as a check on the merits of the activist proposal because the 
activist nominees, even if elected to the board, cannot implement the activist’s 
agenda without persuading their fellow directors of its merit. Perhaps as a 
 
L. REV. 857, 860 n.6 (1993) (“Bidders, like tulips, must now sprout in the spring, with offers 
orchestrated to coincide with the April-May cycle of annual board elections.”). 
70 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards 
Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1071, 1074 (1990). 
71 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, 
Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 890-92 (2002) (describing the powerful antitakeover 
effect of a staggered board in combination with a poison pill); William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and 
Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1403-05 (2007). 
72 See SEC Grants No-Action Relief to Activist Shareholders Seeking to “Round Out” Short Slates with 
Each Other’s Nominees, GIBSON DUNN (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
pages/SECGrantsNo-ActionReliefToActivistShareholdersSeekingtoRoundOutShortSlates.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/F542-6NDG] (stating that running a “short slate” has become “the preferred 
approach for dissidents seeking board representation”). This is not to say that contests to unseat the 
entire board do not happen, just that they are rare. See, e.g., Julie Jargon et al., Starboard Succeeds in 
Replacing Entire Darden Board: Hedge Fund to Have Two of Its Own Partners on Board of Olive Garden, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2014, 4:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/darden-shareholders-elect-all-12-
starboard-nominated-directors-1412949459 [http://perma.cc/75LG-N6PE] (reporting on Starboard’s 
successful campaign to replace the entire Darden board through a proxy contest). 
73 See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No.  
34-31326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249). 
74 See MARC WEINGARTEN, SCHULTE, ROTH & ZABEL, SHORT SLATES, MAJORITY SLATES 
AND FULL SLATES: STRATEGIC AND VOTING CONSIDERATIONS 2 (2008), http://www.srz.com/ 
files/News/a4b75e18-db59-4c29-9c3a-8b3856c73f5b/Preview/NewsAttachment/f4fba66e-93db-467d 
-b2a5-92f6b8814405/filesfilesAI_Spring_2008_Weingarten_Short_Slates_Majority_Slates_Full_ 
Slates.pdf [http://perma.cc/8FFA-DPM3] (“[T]he hurdle to obtaining support from Risk 
Metrics/Institutional Shareholder Services (‘ISS’) and the other proxy advisory firms is considerably 
higher for a control slate than it is for a short slate.”). 
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result of these advantages, activists have enjoyed high success rates in their 
bids for short slate board representation.75 
Even with short slate election contests, the identity of the activist 
nominees can become a source of controversy. In the past, it was the norm for 
hedge fund principals to serve as activist director candidates. Prominent 
activists such as Bill Ackman, Carl Icahn, and Dan Loeb have frequently taken 
seats on the boards of their target companies in an effort to advocate for their 
proposed strategic changes.76 Critics meanwhile have questioned whether a 
hedge fund representative can adequately serve the interests of all shareholders 
or will instead function inappropriately as a “constituency director.”77 They 
have also raised concerns that hedge fund principals will make improper use 
of corporate information.78 In addition, particular hedge fund representatives 
have been characterized as divisive presences on a corporate board and lacking 
the ability to interact appropriately with the incumbent directors.79 
Responding to this concern as well as the general preference for 
independent directors by many institutional investors, some activists have 
 
75 According to SharkRepellent, shareholder activists had a 73% success rate in board seat 
campaigns in 2015, up from 60% in 2014. An Early Look at 2015 US Proxy Fight Statistics, 
SHARKREPELLENT (June 8, 2015), https://www.sharkrepellent.net/request?an=dt.getPage&st=un 
defined&pg=/pub/rs_20150608.html&rnd=486544 [https://perma.cc/ZJP9-QH4F]. 
76 See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced, 2 Big Investors Get Their Say at J.C. Penney, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Jan. 24, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/2-big-investors-get-their-say-
at-j-c-penney [http://perma.cc/3HP6-JWKE] (reporting Bill Ackman’s appointment to the board of 
J.C. Penney); Michael J. de la Merced, Icahn to Get Boards Seats in Settlement with Manufacturer 
Manitowoc, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 9, 2015), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/manit 
owoc-to-give-icahn-board-seats-in-settlement [http://perma.cc/WX7H-CXZ8] (describing settlement 
giving Carl Icahn seats on the boards of two Manitowoc companies); Antoine Gara & Nathan Vardi, 
Billionaire Dan Loeb Wins Board Seats at Dow, His Second Victory this Week, FORBES (Nov. 21, 2014, 
10:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2014/11/21/billionaire-dan-loeb-wins-board-
seats-at-dow-his-second-victory-this-week [http://perma.cc/4W2E-HH2T] (recounting Dan Loeb’s 
successful win of two board seats at Dow). 
77 See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director 
Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 763 (2008) (expressing 
concern over “individuals who may be elected to the board by . . . particular constituencies of the 
corporation”); Steven Seiden, Calling Those with Fortitude: So You Need a Dissident Director, BUS. L. 
TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 1999, at 29, 29 (arguing that “only independent directors with no connection to 
the activist ought to be nominated by him”). Often the chief critic is the company itself which is 
opposing this nominee. See Press Release, Forest Labs., Inc., Forest Laboratories Sends Letter to 
Shareholders (July 16, 2012), http://news.frx.com/press-release/corporate-news/forest-laboratories-
sends-letter-shareholders-0 [http://perma.cc/P69W-6U2M] (“[Daniel Ninivaggi] is a salaried 
employee and President of Icahn Enterprises, and as such, you can fairly question whether he will 
put your interests above the financial objectives of Icahn Enterprises.”). 
78 See, e.g., David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Boardroom Confidentiality Under Focus, N.Y. 
L.J., Jan. 23, 2014, at 5. 
79 Cf. Third Point LLP v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, slip op. at 51 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) 
(stating in dictum that hedge fund activist Dan Loeb conducted himself in an “aggressive and 
domineering manner . . . in relation to Sotheby’s”). 
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chosen to nominate director candidates who are not employed by or affiliated 
with the activist.80 Air Products took this approach to an extreme in its 2010 
attempt to take over Airgas, nominating three director candidates who had 
no ties at all to Air Products. Air Products then touted the independence of 
its candidates as a strength in the election contest.81 
The challenge for an activist in a short slate election is that, even if the 
activist is successful in having its short slate nominees elected, there is no 
guarantee that the activist nominees will be able to persuade the rest of the 
board. The risk increases if the activist nominees are truly independent. Air 
Products represents the extreme case. Not only did the Air Products 
nominees fail to persuade the rest of the board to accept Air Products’ tender 
offer, but the reverse happened; after being elected, the Air Products nominees 
sided with the incumbent directors and voted against the takeover.82 
The Airgas situation—a short slate campaign with truly independent director 
candidates—thus presents a challenge for the activist. To be successful, the 
activist must identify independent and well-qualified director nominees. The 
activist must then provide those nominees—who are not employees of or 
investors in the activist hedge fund—with sufficient motivation to go through 
an election contest and, if elected, serve on a possibly divided and hostile 
target company board. At the same time, the activist would like to provide its 
nominees with an incentive to remain loyal to the activist’s agenda. To achieve 
these objectives, several hedge funds developed novel pay packages—golden 
leashes—to compensate their nominees in the context of proxy fights. 
B. An Activist Innovation—The Golden Leash 
In 2012, JANA, a New York-based hedge fund, acquired a significant 
position in Agrium, a Canadian fertilizer manufacturer, and announced a 
 
80 It is not always easy for activists to find independent directors willing to serve as activist 
nominees. Accepting such a candidacy may tarnish the nominee’s reputation with issuers. See, e.g., 
JoAnn S. Lublin, Activists Enlist Help of Recruiters: Search Firms Gingerly Wade into Finding Potential 
Directors for Dissident Slates, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424 
127887324324404579045431388717494 [http://perma.cc/RB3W-YPKP] (explaining increasing use by 
activists of director search firms to identify truly independent and qualified directors to temper the 
“activists’ reputation as buccaneers”). 
81 Steven M. Davidoff, A Case Study: Air Products v. Airgas and the Value of Strategic Judicial 
Decision-Making, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 502, 513 (2012). 
82 Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 88-89 (Del. Ch. 2011). This may have 
been strategic on the part of the new directors. By appearing to join a majority that was inevitably 
going to reject the Air Products offer, the new directors appeared to be willing to listen to the other 
Airgas directors and could remain a part of the negotiation. 
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proxy contest to elect five members to Agrium’s twelve member board.83 In 
its proxy statement, JANA disclosed that, if its nominees were elected, they 
would receive additional compensation paid directly by JANA.84 In addition 
to a flat payment of $50,000 each, the JANA-nominated directors would 
collectively be paid 2.6% of JANA’s net gain on its Agrium investment.85 At 
the time of the proxy fight, JANA’s investment in Agrium was approximately 
$1 billion, so the dissident nominees had the potential to be compensated 
millions of dollars by the fund.86 These payments were far greater than 
standard directors’ fees.87 This compensation was also derived from a 
different source—from the activist hedge fund rather than from the company.88 
Agrium responded by filing its own proxy solicitation materials in which 
it termed the JANA pay plan a “golden leash” and attacked the arrangement 
as “unheard of in Canada.”89 Agrium argued that the golden leashes 
undermined the JANA nominees’ independence and were “structured to 
 
83 Nadia Damouni & Rod Nickel, Exclusive: Activist Jana Digs In for Long Agrium Battle, 
REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/26/us-agrium-jana-idUS 
BRE89P05Z20121026 [http://perma.cc/6M8X-C4MN]. 
84 JANA PARTNERS LLC, SOLICITATION BY AND ON BEHALF OF JANA PARTNERS LLC 
FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE HOLDERS OF COMMON SHARES OF AGRIUM INC. 8 (2012), http://
www.infomine.com/index/pr/PB/25/44/PB254436.pdf [http://perma.cc/NKT5-ADSF]. 
85 Steven M. Davidoff, Upping the Ante in a Play for a Stronger Board, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(Apr. 2, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/upping-the-ante-in-a-play-for-a-stronger-b
oard [http://perma.cc/FTC6-J8Q6]. 
86 See Rob Gillies, Agrium Nominees Elected to the Board, YAHOO! (Apr. 9, 2013, 3:51 PM), 
http://news.yahoo.com/agrium-nominees-elected-board-193008279.html [http://perma.cc/N9UJ- 
W2UL] (“The hedge fund spent more than $1 billion for a 7.5 percent stake in Agrium . . . .”). 
87 See AGRIUM, NOTICE OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS AND 
MANAGEMENT PROXY CIRCULAR 78 (2013) (stating that the incumbent Agrium directors received 
on average $43,490 Canadian dollars plus $149,348 in incentives for their service in 2012, and that 
the average director made $134,000 in annual cash and incentive compensation). See generally Steven 
M. Davidoff et al., Do Outside Directors Face Labor Market Consequences? A Natural Experiment from 
the Financial Crisis, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 53 (2014) (surveying total director compensation during 
the period from 2006 to 2010 for the S&P 1500 and finding average director compensation to be 
$133,000). It is worth noting, however, that the incumbent Agrium directors held tens of thousands 
of shares of Agrium stock through option grants and that, as a result of these grants, they too stood 
to receive millions of dollars in compensation if Agrium’s stock price increased substantially. See 
AGRIUM, supra note 87, at 36 (stating that as of March 2012, eight of ten Agrium directors had more 
than a million dollars of Agrium equity at risk, and that four of ten had over two million). 
88 When Agrium raised this as a reason to oppose JANA’s nominees in the context of the proxy 
fight, the director nominees defended the arrangement by noting that “[i]t is true that Jana bears 
this expense, but that is true of every expense in this effort . . . . Despite Agrium’s misleading claims, 
none of us will be bound by any duty other than our fiduciary duty as directors.” Lauren Krugel, 
Agrium Wins bcIMC Support in Battle with Jana Partners, GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 15, 2013, 5:24 PM), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/agrium-wins-bcimc-support-in-battle-with-jana-
partners/article9838651 [http://perma.cc/2H8X-3YAE]. 
89 Press Release, Agrium, Agrium Urges Shareholders to Vote the White Proxy for Agrium’s 
Director Nominees (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.agrium.com/en/investors/news-releases/2013/agrium-
urges-shareholders-vote-white-proxy-agriums-director-nominees [http://perma.cc/L5SV-VUNT]. 
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incentivize short-term actions, even if they are taken at the expense of greater 
long-term value.”90 JANA ultimately lost the election for reasons that likely 
had little to do with the golden leash arrangements.91 The issue of the golden 
leash, for Agrium at least, became moot.92 
At around the same time, Elliott offered a similar compensation 
arrangement to its dissident nominees to the board of Hess, an oil company. 
Elliott’s nominees would receive $50,000 up front and an additional $30,000 
for each percentage point by which Hess shares outperformed the stock of a 
group of peer companies over a period of years, up to nine million dollars for 
each director.93 Again, these payments were to be made by the nominating 
hedge fund, not the company itself. If made, the payments could result in the 
dissident directors being compensated more than either their peers on the 
board or other directors generally. 
Not surprisingly, as in the Agrium dispute, the pay arrangement came 
under fire during the ensuing proxy fight.94 Unlike the prior situation, 
however, the Elliott nominees reacted by waiving their right to the 
compensation package.95 Although Hess initially argued that this concession 
proved the underlying self-interest of Elliott’s nominees,96 the company 
 
90 Id. In fact, Agrium engaged in some questionable tactics of its own, at least from a U.S. 
perspective. For example, Agrium paid twenty-five cents per share to investment advisors whose 
clients voted in support of the full Agrium slate, a common tactic in Canada, but one certainly 
raising conflict issues. Stephen Erlichman, The Agrium Fight: Agrium Payments Don’t Pass the ‘Smell 
Test,’ GLOBE & MAIL (July 4, 2013, 6:45 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/payments-dont-pass-the-smell-test/article13010420 [http://perma.cc/CXA6-MSC2]. 
91 See Ronald Barusch, Dealpolitik: Agrium Lesson for Activists: Don’t Underestimate the Adversary, 
WALL ST. J.: DEAL J. (Apr. 12, 2013, 4:08 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2013/04/12/dealpolitik- 
agrium-lesson-for-activists-dont-underestimate-the-adversary [http://perma.cc/TL89-YE9A] (describing 
JANA as outgunned by Agrium’s aggressive tactics). 
92 JANA was hardly gracious in its loss. Barry Rosenstein, a JANA managing partner and 
nominee to the Agrium board, addressed the incumbent board at an annual meeting: “You are a 
Board that proved that if you play dirty enough, violate all precepts of good corporate governance, 
fair play, ethical behavior, and democracy, you can still lose the campaign but then barely 
manufacture a victory after the voting is supposed to be over.” Id. 
93 Hess Corp., Definitive Additional Materials (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 26, 2013). 
94 See Press Release, Hess Corp., Hess Sends Letter to Shareholders (Mar. 26, 2013), http:// 
phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=101801&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1800473 [http://perma.cc/2 
BHK-AUFW] (“We find the prospect of Paul Singer, a shareholder, potentially paying directors 
millions of dollars in contingency fees for pre-determined outcomes to be highly troublesome from 
a governance perspective, and have concerns about the Singer directors’ ability to act as fiduciaries 
on behalf of all Hess shareholders.”). 
95 Hess Corp., Soliciting Material Pursuant to § 240.14a-12 (Schedule 14A) (May 13, 2013). 
96 Press Release, Hess Corp., Hess Comments on Elliott Letter: Notes that Elliott’s Nominees 
Finally Have Acknowledged that Their Short-Term, Conflicted Compensation Agreement Was 
Wrong (May 13, 2013), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=101801&p=irol-newsArticle&I 
D=1818618 [http://perma.cc/BS83-3U9S]. 
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eventually capitulated to shareholder pressure and settled with Elliott, 
ultimately allowing three of the five nominees onto the board.97 
Carl Icahn followed suit, nominating a candidate98 for the board of Forest 
Laboratories (Forest)99 who stood to receive $65,000 per month for the proxy 
contest as well as 1% of Icahn’s profits on Forest stock above $47.50 per share for 
profits earned within thirty months of the candidate being elected to the board.100 
Forest described this arrangement as creating “significant and obvious conflicts” 
that would compromise the candidate’s independence and ability to represent 
all stockholders.101 Forest ultimately elected one of Icahn’s candidates to the 
board, but the candidate with the golden leash arrangement was not elected.102 
Although golden leash compensation arrangements ultimately were not 
triggered at Agrium, Hess, or Forest, the innovation attracted considerable 
attention in the media and among legal commentators, leading to strong 
arguments both for and against such arrangements.103 The most basic 
argument in favor of activist compensation arrangements is that proxy 
contests are expensive and time-consuming and can damage a dissident 
nominee’s reputation; therefore, qualified independent nominees will avoid 
them unless offered a significant inducement in the form of additional 
compensation. For example, the JANA slate for Agrium included officers and 
directors of publicly traded agriculture and chemical companies as well as a 
 
97 Hess and Elliott Reach Resolution to End Proxy Contest, BUS. WIRE (May 16, 2013, 8:30 AM), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130516005692/en/Hess-Elliott-Reach-Resolution-Proxy- 
Contest#.U5xhv7HGBo4 [http://perma.cc/6NJ9-X86B]. 
98 The candidate, Eric Ende, was one of four Icahn nominees in 2012. Press Release, Forest Labs., 
Inc., Forest Laboratories Sends Letter to Shareholders (July 16, 2012), http://news.frx.com/press-release/ 
corporate-news/forest-laboratories-sends-letter-shareholders-0 [http://perma.cc/288P-6CFU]. 
99 Icahn had waged an unsuccessful proxy contest at Forest the previous year. Michael J. de la 
Merced, Forest Labs Defeats Icahn in Proxy Fight, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 18, 2011), http://deal
book.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/forest-labs-defeats-icahn-in-proxy-fight [http://perma.cc/FK99-HL75]. 
100 Press Release, Forest Labs., Inc., supra note 98; see also Paritosh Bansal & Lewis Krauskopf, 
Icahn Dangles Bounty for Nominee in Forest Fight, REUTERS (June 29, 2012, 5:25 PM), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/29/us-forest-icahn-idUSBRE85S0RX20120629 [http://perma.cc/ 
H8PY-8QCZ]. The terms of the leash were disclosed in Icahn’s proxy statement. See Forest Labs., 
Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (July 23, 2012). 
101 Press Release, Forest Labs., Inc., supra note 98. 
102 David Benoit, Icahn Lands One Seat on Forest Labs Board, WALL ST. J.: DEAL J. (Aug. 15, 
2012, 11:21 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/08/15/icahn-lands-one-seat-on-forest-labs-board 
[http://perma.cc/DP8S-R236]. The following year, Forest agreed to nominate an additional Icahn 
representative to its board to avoid a third election contest. Ransdell Pierson & Bill Berkrot, Forest 
Labs to Add Icahn Rep to Board, Avert Proxy Fight, REUTERS (June 11, 2013, 2:44 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/11/us-forestlaboratories-icahn-idUSBRE95A0OZ20130611 
[http://perma.cc/4WLY-ZQ5U]. 
103 For a detailed examination of these arguments and a defense of the golden leash, see 
generally Edward M. Iacobucci, Special Compensation Arrangements for Dissident Directors in Proxy 
Contests: A Policy Analysis, 55 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 365 (2014) and Yaron Nili, Servants of Two Masters? 
The Feigned Hysteria over Activist-Paid Directors, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2016). 
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Canadian former Member of Parliament and minister of agriculture.104 The 
Elliott slate for Hess meanwhile consisted of petroleum company chief 
executives and board members.105 
Furthermore, the golden leash packages were structured to create 
incentives for the activist nominees, once seated, to push the company to 
outperform. Were the newly-seated directors successful in doing so, all 
shareholders would have profited. Even better, from the unaffiliated 
shareholders’ perspective, the cost of the incentive compensation was to be 
borne entirely by the activist, not the company itself. Shareholders were thus 
put in the position of free riders, enjoying the positive externality of the 
nominees’ incentive to perform without bearing any of the cost. 
The leading argument against activist compensation arrangements is that 
such arrangements pose a threat to a director’s fiduciary duty by providing an 
incentive for the director to favor the interests of the shareholder that is 
paying him or her rather than the interests of all shareholders. A seated 
nominee might seek to curry favor with the activist in hopes, perhaps, of 
earning additional compensation. In those situations where the activist’s 
interest conflicts with that of other shareholders, the special pay arrangement 
might cause the director to push the activist’s agenda. It is worth pointing out 
that most golden leash compensation arrangements, including the ones in 
Hess, Agrium, and Forest, are hardwired. The activists had already agreed, in 
a binding contract, to make the supplemental payments if their nominees, 
once seated, hit the specified performance hurdles, leaving the activists with no 
subsequent discretion as to whether or not to make the payments—the 
payments would be required if the profit hurdles were achieved. As a result, 
the nominees would have no need to curry favor with the activist. 
Even if the promise to pay is binding and nondiscretionary, opponents 
might still argue that the terms of the compensation arrangement are 
problematic because they originate outside the firm and are set by a party 
with no fiduciary duty to shareholders. In other words, the compensation 
arrangement itself may not be in shareholders’ best interests. Opponents of 
activism may argue that such arrangements do not in fact serve the interests of 
all shareholders because they over-incentivize directors to push for short-term 
returns over long-term profitability. Here the debate over activism recycles, 
in slightly altered form, familiar tropes from the takeover debate.106 Emphasis 
on short-term returns may result in greater risk taking or leverage or the 
 
104 JANA PARTNERS LLC, supra note 84. 
105 Hess Corp., supra note 93. 
106 See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for 
Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 521-23 (2002) (outlining debate about whether takeovers are 
value-increasing). 
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avoidance of investment opportunities with longer time horizons. Normally, 
the board of directors is thought to counterbalance the short-term interests 
of such shareholders. However, if these shareholders are able to put their 
nominees on the board and use potentially lucrative pay packages to ensure 
that those nominees continue to focus on short-term rewards, the activists 
damage the long-term health of the corporation. 
No corporate authority has passed judgment on whether golden leash 
compensation arrangements are good for shareholders. The terms of the 
debate were set by non-fiduciaries with their own (arguably short-term) 
agendas.107 In the context of a takeover, at least, minority shareholders have 
the chance to sell for a control premium. In the context of activism, minority 
shareholders do not receive a control premium but are nevertheless subject to 
the activist’s managerial whims. Thus, according to this view, it is problematic 
to have a fiduciary’s compensation set by a nonfiduciary notwithstanding the 
binding, nondiscretionary nature of its terms. 
C. The Advisors Strike Back 
On May 9, 2013, Wachtell publicly released a memorandum attacking the 
golden leash. The memorandum recited several of the above-described 
arguments against activist compensation arrangements and cited to several 
other commentators who had criticized the use of the golden leash.108 The 
memorandum went on to suggest that issuers could protect themselves from 
the risk of nominees coming forward under the terms of such preferential 
compensation packages by adopting a bylaw prohibiting golden leash 
arrangements.109 The memorandum went so far as to propose a model golden 
leash bylaw: 
No person shall qualify for service as a director of the Corporation if he or 
she is a party to any compensatory, payment or other financial agreement, 
arrangement or understanding with any person or entity other than the 
Corporation, or has received any such compensation or other payment from 
any person or entity other than the Corporation, in each case in connection 
with candidacy or service as a director of the Corporation; provided that 
agreements providing only for indemnification and/or reimbursement of 
out-of-pocket expenses in connection with candidacy as a director (but not, 
for the avoidance of doubt, in connection with service as a director) and any 
 
107 Hedge funds may be short-term oriented due to the need to demonstrate performance to 
their investors, or as a result of liquidity concerns. Other shareholders, not subject to these 
considerations, may take a longer view of corporate performance. 
108 Lipton, supra note 11. 
109 Id. 
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pre-existing employment agreement a candidate has with his or her employer 
(not entered into in contemplation of the employer’s investment in the 
Corporation or such employee’s candidacy as a director), shall not be 
disqualifying under this bylaw.110 
The bylaw, as proposed, was written to cover a broader range of 
compensation arrangements than those reflected in the Elliott and JANA 
golden leashes. It disqualified a nominee who received any compensation in 
connection with his or her candidacy or service (other than indemnification 
or reimbursement of expenses) from a source other than the corporation 
itself. Thus, not only would the rich incentive packages offered to nominees 
in cases like Agrium and Hess lead to nominee disqualifications under such a 
bylaw, but so too would small cash payments intended simply to induce 
dissident nominees to go through the painful process of a proxy fight. 
Wachtell defended the legality of the disqualification bylaw by pointing 
to the statutory authority of boards to “prescribe other qualifications for 
directors” through a charter or bylaw provision.111 The firm further argued 
that the business judgment rule should protect the decision to adopt such a 
bylaw or that, should a heightened standard of review be found to apply, the 
board’s decision “should withstand scrutiny as a measured response to the 
threat posed by these inappropriate schemes.”112 
In the months following the release of the Wachtell Memorandum, the 
boards of thirty-two issuers amended their bylaws to adopt provisions 
prohibiting golden leash compensation arrangements.113 Most of the bylaws 
were similar or identical to the Wachtell model, and their rapid adoption 
threatened to limit activists’ ability to use golden leashes. 
The adoption of these bylaws triggered a response by ISS. ISS, the 
predominant proxy advisory firm, provides information and recommendations 
to its institutional investor clients in connection with their voting decisions.114 
Notably, ISS’s voting recommendations are based, in part, on its evaluation 
of an issuer’s corporate governance.115 In its proxy voting policy guidelines, 
ISS explains that its voting recommendations “are intended to assist 
 
110 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
111 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2015). The legality of the bylaw, however, is unclear; 
while Delaware courts have generally upheld a range of takeover defenses, they have applied greater 
scrutiny to board actions that interfere with the electoral process. See Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 
564 A.2d 651, 652, 655 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that board actions taken primarily to interfere with 
the shareholder franchise must have “compelling justification”). 
112 Lipton, supra note 11. 
113 See infra Table I. 
114 See Proxy Voting Services, ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/governance-solutions/proxy-v 
oting-services [http://perma.cc/G93M-4EUH] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
115 See ISS Global Voting Principles, ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/policy-gateway/iss-glob 
al-voting-principles [http://perma.cc/2J4V-7R45] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
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institutional investors in meeting their fiduciary requirements with respect 
to voting by promoting long-term shareholder value creation and risk 
mitigation at their portfolio firms through support of responsible global 
corporate governance practices.”116 
On November 12, 2013, ISS recommended that shareholders withhold 
their votes from the members of the Nominating and Governance Committee 
of Provident, a firm that had adopted the disqualification bylaw.117 ISS stated 
that it constituted a “material governance failure” for the Provident board to 
adopt a bylaw that significantly impacted shareholder rights without seeking 
shareholder input.118 As ISS explained, the disqualification bylaw would 
“unduly restrict investors’ ability to nominate and elect otherwise qualified 
individuals via a proxy contest.”119 
On November 26, 2013, ISS released a further explanation of its position. 
In a public memorandum, ISS identified “the potentially chilling effect of 
this bylaw on the quality of dissident candidates in future proxy contests.”120 
Hence, according to ISS, the bylaw could “have a detrimental effect on the 
quality of dissident candidates, without providing shareholders any reasonable 
benefit.”121 Importantly, ISS signaled that its concern about golden leash 
bylaws extended beyond the single case of Provident. In the memorandum, 
ISS included a list of all of those companies known to it to have adopted such 
bylaws, implicitly suggesting that these companies could expect future 
withhold recommendations if they did not reconsider their bylaws.122 
Not every ISS policy position generates a voting response by investors.123 
Nevertheless, investors responded to the concerns ISS raised regarding the 
Wachtell Bylaw. On November 27, 2013, Provident announced the voting 
results from its annual meeting.124 Provident’s director nominees received a 
withhold vote of 34%.125 High withhold votes are of particular concern, even in 
uncontested elections, because they signal widespread investor dissatisfaction.126 
 
116 2015 Policy Information, ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/policy-gateway/2015-policy-in 
formation [http://perma.cc/HZZ4-KU7K] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
117 ISS PROXY ADVISORY SERVS., REPORT ON PROVIDENT FINANCIAL HOLDINGS, INC. 
(Nov. 12, 2013). The report was released after the close of business. 
118 Id. at 1. 
119 Id. 
120 CERNICH ET AL., supra note 12, at 2. 
121 Id.; see also ISS, DIRECTOR QUALIFICATION/COMPENSATION BYLAW FAQS 1 (2014) 
[hereinafter ISS FAQS] (“The adoption of restrictive director qualification bylaws without 
shareholder approval may be considered a material failure of governance because the ability to elect 
directors is a fundamental shareholder right.”). 
122 CERNICH ET AL., supra note 12, at 2; see also ISS FAQS, supra note 121, at 1. 
123 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
124 Provident Fin. Holdings, Inc., Annual Meeting Results (Form 8-K) (Nov. 26, 2013). 
125 Id. 
126 Choi et al., supra note 52, at 63. 
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A 34% withhold vote would certainly be characterized as “high,”127 and boards 
often respond to high withhold votes by complying with activists’ requests.128 
On January 13, 2014, ISS released new policy updates formalizing its 
position.129 In those updates, ISS announced that it would treat the Wachtell 
Bylaw, along with any other bylaw amendment unilaterally adopted by the 
board that had the effect of materially diminishing shareholder rights, as a 
“material failure of [corporate] governance.”130 Barring extraordinary 
circumstances, ISS now recommends withhold for directors of companies 
exhibiting a material failure of corporate governance.131 ISS, in other words, 
recommends withhold against directors who adopt the Wachtell Bylaw. 
Investors took the ISS position seriously, not only at Provident, but also 
at other companies that had adopted the Wachtell Bylaw. Table I sets forth 
the results of director elections at companies that had adopted the Wachtell 
Bylaw and held a shareholder meeting prior to repealing the Bylaw. The 
middle two columns report the averages of the percentage of yes votes cast 
for each director up for election at the given fiscal year’s annual meeting. 
 
 
127 Id.; see also Diane Del Guercio et al., Do Boards Pay Attention When Institutional Investor 
Activists “Just Vote No”?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 84, 89 (2008) (describing “withhold” votes of more than 
20% as “substantial”). 
128 Del Guercio et al., supra note 127, at 89 (“[A] strong showing of withheld support increases 
the probability that the board will comply with activists’ requests.”). 
129 ISS FAQS, supra note 121, at 1. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
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Table I shows that companies that did not immediately repeal the 
Wachtell Bylaw typically suffered a significant reduction in yes votes cast as 
a result of increased withhold votes. The median number of yes votes cast for 
these companies was 70.75% compared to 96.98% for those that had repealed 
the Wachtell Bylaw by the time of the shareholder vote. This difference is 
highly statistically significant at the 1% confidence level based on a Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test. The difference appears to be driven by the ISS position on the 
Wachtell Bylaw. The average votes cast for those companies with significant 
withhold votes in 2014 differ from the 2013 figures for all but two of those 
companies.132 For example, Chatham Lodging Trust had an average yes vote 
for its directors of 80.52% in 2013 compared to 53.43% in 2014 when the 
Wachtell Bylaw was in effect. Chatham Lodge subsequently repealed its 
golden leash bylaw. 
Issuers responded rapidly to the ISS warning and the demonstrated 
shareholder support for the ISS position. By May 20, 2014, twenty-eight of 
thirty-two companies had retracted the bylaw in whole or in part, many on 
the eve of their shareholder meetings. Even Wachtell acknowledged that 
issuer adoption of the bylaws was risky in light of both the ISS position and 
widespread institutional opposition.133 As of January 15, 2016 only three 
issuers retain director compensation bylaws.134 
The golden leash, by contrast, is far from dead. In November 2014, activist 
shareholder Third Point disclosed that it had agreed to a golden leash 
arrangement with its two nominees for the Dow board of directors.135 Third 
Point’s nominees would each receive $250,000 for agreeing to serve as a 
nominee and an additional $250,000 if elected, which would be invested in 
Dow stock.136 In addition, each nominee would receive two additional cash 
payments from Third Point based on the appreciation of approximately 
400,000 shares of Dow common stock following October 2, 2014.137 Dow and 
Third Point settled the matter, avoiding a public proxy contest, on terms that 
 
132 We note that National Fuel Gas Co., First Reliance Bancshares, and Entropic Communications, 
Inc. all had below-average levels of institutional ownership. 
133 See Martin Lipton, ISS Addresses Dissident Director Compensation Bylaw, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/11/21/ 
iss-addresses-dissident-director-compensation-bylaw [http://perma.cc/4MRP-NNFB]; see also Holly 
J. Gregory, Using Board-Adopted Bylaws to Reduce Corporate Threats, PRAC. L. (July 1, 2014), http:// 
us.practicallaw.com/6-572-8667 (noting that “some large institutional shareholders, the Council of 
Institutional Investors (CII) and key proxy advisors have expressed concerns” over the adoption of 
the Wachtell Bylaw). 
134 See supra Table I. Entropic Communications was acquired on April 30, 2015. 
135 David Benoit & Joann S. Lublin, Third Point Revives ‘Golden Leash’ Pay Plan in Dow Chemical 
Fight, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/third-point-revives-gold 
en-leash-pay-plan-in-dow-chemical-fight-1416171616 [http://perma.cc/T5HV-ZUYB]. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
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involved Dow’s agreement to add Third Point’s nominees to the board as well 
as two additional independent directors.138 Under the terms of the agreement, 
the Third Point nominees kept their compensation packages, making them 
the first sitting directors compensated pursuant to a golden leash.139 
Moreover, in the February 2015 attack on General Motors by a group of 
four activist hedge funds, the activists disclosed that their nominee, Harry 
Wilson, would “receive a percentage of the group’s profits from their 
investment in GM.”140 The Wilson golden leash was novel in that it consisted 
of separate contracts with each of the four hedge funds, and each contract had 
different terms.141 The GM contest was settled when GM agreed to buy back 
$5 billion worth of stock and Wilson did not receive a board position.142 
Nonetheless, the golden leash lives. 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The saga of the golden leash, the Wachtell Bylaw, and the ISS 
recommendation presents a natural experiment to test how investors value 
corporate governance. We begin, in Sections A and B, by analyzing the thirty-
two companies that had adopted the Wachtell Bylaw to determine if there is 
any clear pattern to explain their actions. In Section C, we then conduct time 
series analysis of the share prices of the thirty-two companies around principal 
dates surrounding the adoption and repeal of the Wachtell Bylaw. Our goal is 
to discern if investors value these governance changes, and if so, whether they 
assign them negative or positive values. Finally, in Section D, we consider the 
effects of the Wachtell Bylaw on a wider set of firms subject to activist attack. 
A. Data Description 
We obtained from ISS a list of companies that adopted a Wachtell Bylaw 
on or after May 9, 2013, the date Wachtell first proposed a model director 
compensation bylaw. To confirm that no other corporations belong in this list, 
we searched 10-K Wizard for bylaw amendments addressing director 
compensation; we then cross-checked the companies against a similar list that 
Innisfree, a proxy solicitation service, had compiled and provided to us. We 
 
138 David Benoit & Joann Lublin, Dow Chemical, Loeb Settle Board Dispute, WALL ST. J.  
(Nov. 21, 2014, 1:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dow-chemical-third-point-settle-board-dispu
te-1416578708 [http://perma.cc/2Z9Z-J3EX]. 
139 Id. 
140 Press Release, Gen. Motors, supra note 18. 
141 Mark Rogers, GM, Harry Wilson, and the Disturbing Rise of the Golden Leash, FORBES 
LEADERSHIP F. (Mar. 11, 2015, 2:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/20 
15/03/11/gm-harry-wilson-and-the-disturbing-rise-of-the-golden-leash [http://perma.cc/JR9P-CRLG]. 
142 Id. 
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confined our search to the period from May 8, 2013, the date of the Wachtell 
Memorandum, until November 27, 2013, the date when Provident published 
the voting results for its annual meeting. We excluded companies that 
adopted the bylaw in conjunction with an initial public offering or as a 
prelude to being spun off from a parent company. The majority of companies 
adopting a bylaw during this time period used the Wachtell language. We 
arrived at a list of thirty-two companies. 
We also obtained from ISS a list of all companies that subsequently 
repealed their director compensation bylaw. We confirmed that there were no 
other repeals by searching the 10-K Wizard database, confining our search to 
any repeals implemented between November 26, 2013 and June 30, 2014. Our 
search returned a list of twenty-seven companies. 
We then searched the SEC EDGAR database to confirm the date that 
each company publicly filed its disclosure of an adoption or repeal. 
Incorporation data for each of these companies is obtained from the EDGAR 
database. Institutional Ownership information is obtained from Thomson 
Reuters while information on staggered boards and shareholder activism is 
obtained from FactSet SharkRepellent.143 
We measured activism by searching the FactSet SharkRepellent database 
for any proposal by an institutional shareholder for substantive changes to 
corporate organization or operations from May 8, 2012 (one year prior to the 
Wachtell Memorandum) through November 25, 2014 (the one year anniversary 
from the day before the Provident annual meeting). Voting results and 
majority voting policies are also obtained from the FactSet database as well 
as from filings in the SEC EDGAR database. Accounting information is 
obtained from Compustat. Stock price information is obtained from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices database and Yahoo! Finance. Compensation 
data is obtained from Execucomp. Institutional Ownership information is 
obtained from Thomson Reuters. Finally, information on staggered boards 
and shareholder activism is obtained from Factset SharkRepellent. 
B. Analysis—Adopters and Repealers 
In this subsection, we examine the characteristics of the thirty-two 
companies that adopted the Wachtell Bylaw. Table II, Panel A describes 
certain accounting and compensation data for these companies. 
 
 
 
143 FactSet SharkRepellent is a database which records activists’ actions and other information 
concerning takeover defenses and shareholder voting. See generally SHARKREPELLENT, https:// 
www.sharkrepellent.net [https://perma.cc/C3R8-QNGM] (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). 
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Table II: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Accounting and Compensation Information ($MM)144 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. 25th % Median 75th % Max 
Assets $16,884 $62,278 $295 $1154 $3423 $7298 $355,408
Revenues $4076 $5732 $15 $665 $2549 $4944 $29,402
Market Cap.  $7162 $9939 $8 $604 $3961 $8087 $43,087
Net Income $256 $657 -$1185 $3 $96 $403 $2125
ROA 0.023 0.117 -0.364 0.005 0.042 0.074 0.227
Total CEO 
Comp. $7.182 $5.935 $.260 $2.235 $6.354 $8.966 $23.294
 
There is no pattern in terms of size, income, or revenue linking the 
companies which adopt these bylaws. The median market capitalization of 
these companies as of year-end 2013 is $3.961 billion but the mean market 
capitalization is $7.162 billion, with a standard deviation of $9.939 billion, 
which indicates a significant right-skewed range of size for the companies in our 
sample. Similarly, the assets and revenue figures for the sample have a wide 
range which is right-skewed. Companies in our sample have, as of year-end 
2013, median total assets of $3.423 billion. The mean asset size for companies in 
our sample is $16.884 billion and the standard deviation is $62.278 billion. The 
median revenue of these companies in fiscal year 2013 is $2.549 billion with a 
standard deviation of $5.732 billion and a mean of $4.076 billion. 
The majority of companies in our sample are profitable, and the median 
net income for fiscal year 2013 for these companies is $96 million. To further 
explore the profitability of these companies, we calculated their return on assets 
(ROA). ROA measures profitability relative to total assets by dividing net 
income by total assets. The average ROA in fiscal year 2013 for the companies 
in our sample is 2.3%, and the median is 4.2%, which is below the average for 
companies in the Russell 2000 index.145 In our sample, the median chief 
executive officer (CEO) compensation for the last fiscal year prior to 
adoption of an amendment is $6.354 million, and the average is $7.182 million. 
Institutional ownership is one factor that may influence the adoption of 
director compensation bylaws. Low institutional ownership may provide 
 
144 All accounting numbers are for fiscal year 2013. All numbers except ROA are in millions of 
U.S. dollars. Market Capitalization is as of year-end 2013. ROA is return on assets measured as Net 
Income divided by Total Assets for the fiscal year 2013. Total CEO Compensation is as recorded in 
the company’s SEC filing for the annual meeting held immediately prior to the adoption of the 
bylaw and prepared in accordance with SEC rules. 
145 See RUSSELL INVS., SMALL CAP PERSPECTIVES: RUSSELL 2000 INDEX QUARTERLY 
ANALYSIS 10 (2013), http://www.methodologymatters.com/pdfs/R2000%20Small%20Cap%20Persp 
ectives%204Q13%20FINAL%20POSTED.pdf [http://perma.cc/LU5P-MYF4] (“Profitability as 
measured by return on assets (ROA) ended the year at approximately 5.1% . . . .”). 
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companies leeway to take actions which might be disfavored by shareholders. 
If institutional ownership is low, there is no concentrated shareholder base 
which can act effectively to overcome the free rider problem of dispersed 
shareholder ownership. On the other hand, companies with a high number of 
institutional owners may wish to adopt these bylaws because they can prevent 
a small number of shareholders from supporting a shareholder activist. Panel 
B sets forth information on institutional ownership in our sample. 
 
Table II: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B: Institutional Share Ownership146 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. 25th % Median 75th % Max 
Total Inst. Ownership % 66.88% 17.95% 15.74% 61.69% 69.94% 78.74% 92.60%
Top 5 Inst. Ownership 26.00% 6.90% 8.78% 21.97% 27.06% 29.62% 41.86%
Top 10 Inst. Ownership 36.60% 10.23% 11.49% 28.82% 36.79% 43.97% 59.91%
Max Single Inst. 
Ownership 8.28% 2.54% 3.39% 6.37% 8.39% 10.03% 14.00%
 
The median institutional ownership for the companies in our sample as 
of year-end 2013 is 69.94%, showing a high level of institutional involvement. 
The maximum level of institutional ownership for a firm in our sample is 
92.6%. In the sample, the median ownership of Top 5 Institutional 
Ownership—the amount held by the top five institutional holders—is 
27.06%. There are no controlling shareholders in our sample and the 
maximum amount held by a single institutional holder for the median firm is 
8.39%, with a maximum of 14% of the company. Panel C of Table II shows 
other aspects of corporate governance. 
  
 
146 Total Institutional Ownership % is the percentage of total institutional ownership. Top 5 
Institutional Ownership is the percentage ownership of the five largest institutional owners. Top 10 
Institutional Ownership is the percentage ownership of the ten largest institutional owners. 
Maximum Institutional Ownership is the percentage ownership of the largest institutional owner. 
Institutional ownership for each of these variables is as of the year-end 2013. 
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Table II: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Panel C: Corporate Governance147 
 
  Number %  
DE Incorp. 15 46.88%  
Staggered Board 18 56.26%  
Activism 4 12.50%  
 
Companies incorporated in Delaware have been found to trade at a 
premium as compared to other companies.148 This may be due to self-selection 
bias; that is, better companies may opt to incorporate in Delaware. But, it 
also may be that Delaware companies have historically traded at a premium 
due to the better laws and corporate governance apparatus that Delaware 
arguably provides.149 Approximately 47% of our sample (fifteen companies) 
is incorporated in Delaware. 
A staggered board has been found to reduce firm value around the time 
of its adoption.150 For these and other reasons, it has been opposed by 
corporate governance advocates and proxy advisory services, and may be an 
indicator of poor corporate governance practices. 151 In recent years this has 
 
147 As discussed in Section II.A, supra, activism is measured by whether an institutional 
shareholder brought a proposal for substantive changes to corporate organization or operations after 
January 1, 2010, as recorded in the Factset Sharkrepellent database. 
148 See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 527 (2001) 
(“I find that Delaware firms are worth more than similar firms incorporated elsewhere . . . .”). But 
see Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 57 (2004) 
(reporting evidence that the results found by Professor Daines did not continue over a later time 
period); K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Financial Value of Corporate Law: Evidence 
from (Re)-Incorporation 47 (Oct. 14, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2519238 [http://perma.cc/T96W-PY86] (“In the time series the Delaware reincorporation effect has 
a negative association with firm value, while reincorporation into Managerial States[, or 
management friendly jurisdictions,] has a positive association with firm value.”). 
149 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2000) (describing possible reasons for the superiority of 
Delaware law, including the benefits of the Delaware courts). 
150 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 71, at 939 (finding that having staggered boards reduces 
shareholder returns by 8-10% “in the nine months after a hostile bid is launched”); see also Cohen & 
Wang, supra note 46, at 628 (“We find evidence consistent with market participants viewing the 
antitakeover force of staggered boards as bringing about, and not merely reflecting, reduced 
shareholder value.”). 
151 See Cohen & Wang, supra note 46, at 628 (“Certain institutional investors have over time 
become increasingly opposed to staggered boards.”). The repeal of staggered boards is responsive, 
in part, to the Shareholder Rights Project at Harvard Law School. See Daniel M. Gallagher & Joseph 
A. Grundfest, Did Harvard Violate Federal Securities Law? The Campaign Against Classified Boards of 
Directors 22-24 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper Series No. 199, 2014), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2536586 [http://perma.cc/JJ4E-G73E] (discussing the impact of the Harvard project on the 
trend for S&P 500 companies to repeal staggered boards). 
2016] The Case of the Golden Leash 683 
led many S&P 500 companies to “destagger” and repeal their staggered 
boards. As of 2013, only 9.75% of S&P 500 companies had a staggered 
board.152 However, this number rises to 50.66% of the Russell 2000 and 
41.96% of the Russell 3000.153 In our sample approximately 56%, or eighteen 
companies, have a staggered board which is above all three metrics. 
One spur to adopting director compensation bylaws may be an ongoing 
or recent encounter with a shareholder activist.154 We measured activism by 
searching the Factset SharkRepellent database for any proposal by an 
institutional shareholder for substantive changes to corporate organization or 
operations brought after January 1, 2012, but before release of the Wachtell 
Memorandum, with respect to the companies in our sample. We found that 
approximately 12.5% of our sample had an activist event under these 
parameters.155 This is significantly higher than the general rates of activism 
for the S&P 500, Russell 2000, and Russell 3000 companies as measured by 
Factset SharkRepellent. Table III sets forth more in-depth information 
concerning shareholder activism and the companies in our sample for the 
time period from May 8, 2012 (one year prior to the Wachtell Memorandum) 
through November 25, 2014 (approximately one year after the shareholder 
vote for Provident Financial).156 
  
 
152 SHARKREPELLENT, supra note 143. 
153 Id. 
154 See infra Table III. 
155 The types of activism include campaigns to maximize shareholder value, efforts to obtain 
board representation and acquisition activity. 
156 Notably, Table III only reports activist activity that rises to the level reflected in the 
SharkRepellent database. We note that media reports during this time period reflected rumors of 
activism or some lesser level of activist activity for these companies. For example, Eastman Chemical 
was rumored to be a potential JANA activism target in October 2013. Stephen Taub, Taking Barry 
Rosenstein up on his Teaser, INSTITUTIONAL INV.’S ALPHA (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.institutional 
investorsalpha.com/Article/3266536/Taking-Barry-Rosenstein-Up-on-His-Teaser.html [http://perma. 
cc/55VK-7VBH]. Similarly, in March 2013, the media reported that Marathon Oil’s intended CEO 
resigned amidst a wave of shareholder rebellions in the oil and gas industry. Jeff Green et al., 
Marathon Said to Join Oil CEO Search as Bid War Looms, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 4, 2013, 10:46 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-04/marathon-said-to-join-oil-ceo-search-as-bid-
war-looms [http://perma.cc/H9RZ-QUPX]. This activism may have been a factor motivating the 
adoption of the Wachtell Bylaw. It is difficult, however, to gauge the potential economic significance of 
activist activity based on rumors reported by the media, which may contribute to the market’s inability 
to price the significance of the bylaw adoption at these 32 companies. See, e.g., Anna Prior, Icahn Denies 
Having Stake in Peabody Energy, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (May 30, 2013, 1:28 PM), http:// 
blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/05/30/icahn-denies-having-stake-in-peabody-energy [http://perma. 
cc/Y7JT-ZY9A] (reporting that Icahn denied the rumors that he had acquired a stake in Peabody). 
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Table III: Incidence of Significant Shareholder Activism  
(May 8, 2012 through November 25, 2014) 
 
Name of Company 
Activist Event 
Prior to Wachtell 
Bylaw Adoption 
Activist Event 
After Wachtell 
Bylaw Adoption 
Marathon Oil Corp. No No 
FBR & Co.  No No 
Rockwell Automation, Inc. No No 
Nat’l Fuel Gas Co. No No 
McGraw Hill Fin., Inc.  No Yes 
Monmouth Real Estate Inv. Corp. No No 
UMH Props., Inc.  No No 
Tibco Software, Inc. No Yes 
Halliburton Co.  No No 
First Reliance Bancshares, Inc. No No 
Peabody Energy Corp.  No No 
Provident Fin. Holdings, Inc. No No 
Invacare Corp.  No No 
Schnitzer Steel Indus., Inc. No No 
Service Corp. Int’l  No No 
Insperity, Inc.  No No 
Whitewave Foods Co. No No 
Centene Corp.  No No 
Wynn Resorts Ltd. No No 
Joy Glob., Inc.  No No 
Wayne Sav. Bancshares, Inc. (DE) No No 
Entropic Commc’ns, Inc. No No 
Eastman Chem. Co.  No No 
C. R. Bard, Inc. Yes No 
Alexion Pharm., Inc.  No No 
Leggett & Platt, Inc. No No 
Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc.  No No 
Chatham Lodging Trust Yes Yes 
Int’l Game Tech.  Yes No 
WPX Energy, Inc.  Yes No 
Key Energy Servs., Inc.  No No 
Timken Co.  No No 
 
Notably, while these companies experienced a high rate of shareholder 
activism before their adoption of the Wachtell Bylaw, they also experienced 
shareholder activism at the same rate thereafter. This may mean that 
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companies adopted the Wachtell Bylaw in anticipation of future activism. 
Still, based on the SharkRepellent data, there appears to be no discernable 
pattern in the adoption of the Wachtell Bylaw. 
C. Price Effects 
For each of the thirty-two companies—listed in Tables I and III above—
that had adopted the Wachtell Bylaw, we examined the wealth effects of 
firm-specific decisions to adopt and repeal a golden leash bylaw. Table IV sets 
forth our cross-sectional event studies for companies adopting and repealing 
the Wachtell Bylaw. 
 
Table IV: Event Studies of Adoption and Repeal Dates 
 
 Adoptions  Repeals 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant -0.003  -0.012  0.004  -0.004 
 (0.657) (0.135) (0.306) (0.430) 
DE Incorp.   0.019    0.016** 
  (0.141) (0.036) 
N 32  32  27  27 
R2 0.00%  7.24%  0.00%  16.49% 
 
A cross-sectional event study examines the effect of share price 
movements for a set of firms over a single period of time. We conducted the 
analysis by calculating the excess returns of each company on the date of their 
adoption of a director compensation bylaw over the three day period from the 
date of adoption against the Russell 2000 index.157 The three-day period 
includes the trading days before and after the relevant date. Excess returns 
are the amount by which a company in our sample had returns that were 
different than the Russell 2000 Index. We selected this index because it most 
comports with the characteristics of the companies in our sample. We 
hypothesized that if golden leash compensation arrangements facilitate value-
increasing shareholder activism, companies that adopt the Wachtell Bylaw 
would experience a share price decline upon adoption. Alternatively, if golden 
leash arrangements are bad for issuers—consistent with the position 
articulated by target company management and Wachtell—we would expect 
to see a share price increase upon adoption of a bylaw. 
 
157 Our analysis was conducted in accordance with Kothari & Warner. S.P. Kothari & Jerold 
B. Warner, The Econometrics of Event Studies, in 1 HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE 3 (2007). 
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Columns 1 and 2 examine the share price returns of adopting companies. 
In column 1 we regress these excess returns to determine whether there is a 
statistically significant price movement.158 In other words, in general, did 
companies adopting the golden leash experience a statistically significant 
share price movement? We then regressed in column 2 the excess returns 
against the independent variable Delaware incorporation expressed by DE 
Incorp.159 This allowed us to examine whether share prices of Delaware 
companies in particular, a place known for its well-ordered corporate law, 
experienced any unique movement. 
We found in column 1 that the coefficient for the returns upon adoption 
is negative for the entire sample, indicating a decline in value for companies 
that adopt a Wachtell Bylaw. However, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. In column 2 the coefficient for Delaware companies is positive 
meaning that these companies experience a share price gain upon adoption 
of a Wachtell Bylaw, but again this variable is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
We thus did not find that the adoption of a Wachtell Bylaw had a 
statistically significant effect on a company’s share price either for the sample 
as a whole or for Delaware companies. This result is inconsistent with each 
of our hypotheses—that is, first, that we would witness some market reaction 
on each of our event dates and second, that the reaction would be negative on 
May 9, 2013 but positive on November 27, 2013. 
There are several possible explanations for this null finding. The sample 
size may be too small, or the adoption may send countervailing signals that 
cancel each other out. For instance, adoption of the bylaw may signal to the 
market that the issuer’s board anticipates future activist activity, which might 
lead to the higher share prices are typically associated with anticipation of 
activism. On the other hand, adoption may signal a corporation’s unwillingness 
to cooperate with such an activist, or otherwise imply governance practices 
which the market may view as value-decreasing. Because these effects run in 
opposing directions, they may cancel each other out. To further explore this 
hypothesis, we ran an unreported model including the independent variable 
shareholder activism which reflects whether the company experienced any type 
of shareholder activism during the one year period before the Wachtell 
Memorandum through November 25, 2014 (the day before the first 
anniversary of the Provident meeting).160 We found no statistical significance 
 
158 P-values from robust standard errors are shown below the coefficients in parentheses. 
159 The independent variable DE Incorp. is added and is coded 1 if the company is incorporated 
in Delaware and 0 otherwise. 
160 This variable is coded 1 if there is any type of shareholder activism as denoted in the FactSet 
SharkRepellent database and 0 otherwise. 
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in this model, which likely underscores the sample size problem. This 
problem is addressed in Section III.D. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table IV examine the wealth effects of a company’s 
repeal of the Wachtell Bylaw. In column 3, the coefficient on the constant is 
not statistically significant, which shows that for the sample as a whole there 
is no meaningful share price decline when a company repeals its bylaw. When 
the independent variable DE Incorp. is added in column 4, the coefficient is 
positive and significant for that variable at the five percent level, meaning 
that Delaware companies increase in value upon repealing these bylaws. Thus, 
for repeals, Delaware companies have a larger increase in value than do other 
companies in the sample. These effects are discussed below.161 
We also examined other corporate governance variables for both repeals 
and adoptions, including variables for the presence or absence of a staggered 
board. We adopted the same model as in columns 2 and 4, but substituted the 
variable DE Incorp. with a dummy variable indicating the presence or absence 
of a staggered board. As an added check on our results, we examined whether 
the level of institutional ownership affects share price reactions using the 
same model. We found no statistically significant returns related to either of 
these variables. 
These results as a whole show no statistically significant negative reaction 
to the adoption of these bylaws for the companies in our sample. Delaware 
companies, however, do increase in value upon repeal of these provisions, 
perhaps suggesting that for Delaware companies, the bonding to ISS 
recommendations adopted by institutional shareholders signals a greater 
adherence to corporate governance practices valued by shareholders. 
The small sample size is a substantial limitation for these tests, because it 
is difficult to exclude the possibility that it is contributing to the lack of 
significance in our results. We therefore modified our empirical tests to 
address this problem. This adaptation to our empirical method is described 
in the next Section. 
D. Companies Subject to Shareholder Activism 
In light of the limitations associated with the small size of our sample 
of adopters and repealers, we devised an alternative empirical approach. 
 
161 As a robustness check, we ran the same cross-sectional analysis using the S&P 500 and 
Russell 3000 indices to benchmark for expected returns. For adoptions, we found that companies 
have negative excess returns when they adopt these bylaws, statistically significant at the 10% level. 
However, we also found that Delaware companies adopting these bylaws have positive returns, 
statistically significant at the 10% level. For repeals, the results are similar to those shown in Table 
III, though with less statistical significance. 
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While we cannot simply gather a larger sample—as far as we can tell, only 
the thirty-two companies discussed above adopted the Wachtell Bylaw before 
the Provident vote—we were able to examine the effect of the availability of 
the Wachtell Bylaw on a wider set of firms. Because the Wachtell Bylaw is 
likely to have the most pronounced effect on those firms most likely to undergo 
an activist challenge, we isolated a set of those firms using the SharkRepellent 
database. Because the Wachtell Bylaw, like a poison pill, can be adopted 
immediately if needed, we hypothesized that the share price of firms most 
subject to activist attack would react to changes in its availability regardless 
of whether they had in fact adopted it. More specifically, we hypothesized 
that these firms would experience a reduction in share price on May 13, 2013, 
when the Wachtell Bylaw became available, and an increase in share price on 
November 27, 2013, when the availability of the Wachtell Bylaw was 
constrained by a combination of ISS’s policy against it and the demonstrated 
willingness of shareholders to act in a manner consistent with that policy. 
This revised empirical strategy has several advantages. First, by focusing 
on all companies subject to shareholder activism, we were able to identify a 
sample of 486 firms experiencing activism from May 8, 2012 (one year prior 
to the Wachtell Memorandum) through November 25, 2014 (the one-year 
anniversary of the day before the Provident annual meeting), thus increasing 
our sample size more than tenfold. Second, by focusing on all activist targets, 
we eliminated a possible selection effect—that is, that firms adopting the 
Wachtell Bylaw may be less well governed than those that do not. Third, we 
also eliminated the possibility of signaling effects—that is, that by adopting 
the Wachtell Bylaw, firms signaled their general susceptibility to activist 
attack to the market. Table V reports the frequency of different types of 
activism for these firms. 
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Table V: Descriptive Statistics of Activism Types162 
 
 Number %  
Proxy Fight Yes 110 22.63%  
 No 376 77.37%  
  
13D Filer Yes 79 16.26%  
 No 407 83.74%  
  
Exempt Solicitation Yes 54 11.11%  
 No 432 88.89%  
  
Other Campaign Yes 329 67.70%  
 No 157 32.30%  
 
Table V shows that hedge funds have at their disposal, and indeed employ, 
a variety of strategies in shareholder activism campaigns. Proxy Fights, or 
shareholder activism involving a proxy contest by the activist to either unseat 
directors or adopt a shareholder proposal, constituted 22.63% of all activism. 
Activists filing a Schedule 13D with the SEC announcing that they had 
 
162 The sample is taken from FactSet SharkRepellent as discussed supra Section III.A. The 
variables are defined by FactSet SharkRepellent as follows: Proxy Fight is a campaign  
under which a stockholder or group of stockholders solicits the proxy or written consent 
of fellow stockholders in support of a resolution it is advancing. This usually involves the 
election of dissident nominees to the company’s Board of Directors in opposition to the 
company’s director nominees but may also involve campaigns to approve a stockholder 
proposal or to vote against a management proposal (including approving a merger).  
13D Filer is a “[c]ampaign whereby a member of the SharkWatch50 has filed a Schedule 13D with 
the SEC but the filing does not include any publicly disclosed activism.” Exempt Solicitation is a campaign  
pursuant to Rule 14a-2(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . under which a 
dissident can communicate its views to stockholders without having to comply with SEC 
proxy filing and disclosure rules. Unlike a contested solicitation (proxy fight), the 
dissident is not seeking the power to act as proxy for a stockholder and does not provide 
its own proxy card in its materials. 
Other Campaign is  
corporate activism made public by activist investors, including hedge funds, and most 
commonly involve[s] a dissident agitating for changes with the goal of maximizing 
stockholder value or enhancing corporate governance practices. The value maximizing 
campaigns attempt to pressure a company to take action to enhance stockholder value, 
whether by increasing dividends and stock buybacks or by even calling for the breakup or 
sale of the company itself. These campaigns usually take the form of making communications 
and letters sent to management at the targeted companies publicly via 13D filings and 
press releases, and they often also include the threat of a proxy fight for Board seats. 
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acquired more than five percent of the target company’s stock, but who took 
no further action, constituted 16.26% of all activist cases. Exempt 
Solicitations, or shareholder activism where the activist communicates to 
stockholders pursuant to an exemption in the proxy rules to avoid filing a 
proxy statement, constituted 11.11% of activism. Finally, Other Campaigns, 
which includes public agitation for change at the target not accompanied by 
a proxy contest, constituted 67.70% of activism. These numbers exceed 100% 
because some companies experienced more than one kind of activism. 
Table VI contains cross-sectional event studies examining the wealth 
effects of the Wachtell Memorandum, the ISS recommendation, and 
Provident shareholder vote on companies subject to shareholder activism 
during the selected time period. 
 
Table VI: Companies Subject to Shareholder Activism163 
 
 
Wachtell Memo 
(5/9/13) 
ISS Memo
(11/13/13) 
Provident Vote
(11/27/13) 
ISS FAQ 
(1/13/14) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Constant 0.005 -0.001 0.013 -0.000  
 (0.397) (0.808) (0.136) (0.980)  
Proxy Fight -0.008* 0.002 0.016** -0.000  
 (0.084) (0.658) (0.020) (0.928)  
13D Filer -0.005 -0.001 0.019** 0.004  
 (0.435) (0.850) (0.040) (0.430)  
Exempt -0.003 0.004 -0.009 -0.001  
Solicitation (0.656) (0.480) (0.394) (0.870)  
Other -0.001 0.003 0.000 -0.001  
Campaign (0.903) (0.536) (0.960) (0.813)  
N 486 457 454 450  
R2 0.85% 0.28% 3.43% 0.35%  
 
We conducted the analysis in accordance with the models in Table IV by 
calculating the excess returns of each company on the date indicated in each 
column heading. We then regressed the firm’s excess stock return (over the 
 
163 Variables are as defined supra note 162. P-values are in parentheses with ***, **, and * 
representing statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Russell 2000 index return) on the given date against an independent variable 
denoting whether the firm had been subject to the given type of shareholder 
activism from May 8, 2012 (one year prior to the Wachtell Memorandum) 
through November 25, 2014 (the day before the first anniversary of the 
Provident meeting).164 
We analyzed four event dates in this test. The first is May 9, 2013, the date 
of the Wachtell Memorandum. The second is November 13, 2013, the first 
trading date after ISS made its recommendation concerning Provident.165 The 
third is November 27, 2013, the date that the results of the voting at Provident 
were first publicly disclosed. November 27, 2013 was also the day after ISS 
released a report for its M&A Edge customers, again criticizing these bylaws 
and releasing the number and names of companies who had adopted them to 
date. The fourth is January 13, 2014, the date that ISS published a question 
and answer memorandum in which it definitively announced its policy to 
recommend a withhold vote for all companies adopting the Wachtell Bylaw 
or a variation thereof. 
We selected each of these four dates because they are significant events 
with respect to companies’ and the market’s views on the Wachtell Bylaw. 
The May 9, 2013 date is the first broad-based announcement that issuers had 
a mechanism for limiting an activist’s ability to adopt a golden leash 
compensation arrangement. The November 13, 2013 date is theoretically the 
first signal to the market that ISS, the leading proxy advisor, may consistently 
oppose the Wachtell Bylaw. The November 27, 2013 date is the first report 
to the market indicating that institutional shareholders took the ISS 
recommendation seriously and would incorporate it into their voting 
decisions on the election of directors. The January 13, 2014 date is the date on 
which ISS formalized its policy of recommending withhold votes for 
companies adopting a form of the Wachtell Bylaw. Each of these events could 
conceivably have informed the market as to whether companies would adopt 
these bylaws and, depending upon the market’s perception of the value of 
these bylaws, affected stock prices. 
The results of these event studies are as follows. The coefficient for the 
variable Proxy Fight is significant and negative in column 1 of Table VI, 
indicating that upon publication of the Wachtell Memorandum, firms that 
had experienced a recent proxy fight or that were about to experience a proxy 
fight suffered negative returns. This indicates that the market assigned a 
 
164 In these models, the choice of benchmark returns is irrelevant because all returns are 
measured on the same date in a given regression. The independent variables are all dummy variables 
marked as 1 if the firm experiences the type of shareholder activism and 0 otherwise. 
165 ISS issued its recommendation at 5:30 p.m. on November 12, 2013. E-mail from ISS 
Representative to Provident (Jan. 14, 2015) (on file with authors). 
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negative value to these bylaws, and perhaps that the market believed that the 
Wachtell Bylaw would chill wealth-enhancing shareholder activism. In 
column 3 (the November 27 model), the coefficient for the variable Proxy 
Fight is positive and significant at the 5% level. However, there is no 
significance on the variable Proxy Fight in columns 2 or 4. 
The net result is that stock prices of companies in our sample decreased 
upon the release of the Wachtell Memorandum, but increased upon the 
publication of the results of the Provident annual meeting. This finding is 
consistent with the theory that the market believed the Wachtell Bylaw to be 
value-decreasing in companies subject to shareholder activism. In particular, 
the fact that there is significance in column 3, but not columns 2 and 4, is 
consistent with the theory that the market viewed the ISS recommendation 
as a credible force only after institutional shareholders had actually shown a 
willingness to support it. 
Similarly, the independent variable 13D Filer is positive and significant at 
the 5% level in column 3 and negative in column 1 (though not significant). 
Though it carries the potential for greater activism, a 13D Filer reflects a 
lesser form of activism than a Proxy Fight. Therefore, the market reactions 
for these companies may not be as strongly consistent with our findings. 
In comparison, variables for lesser shareholder activism—Exempt 
Solicitation and Other Campaign—are not significant in any columns. This 
accords with the theory that only companies greatly impacted by shareholder 
activism were affected by the change. Because the golden leash directly affects 
the conduct of a proxy contest, the stock prices of companies subject to such 
a contest (either historically or prospectively) were more likely to be 
influenced by the events studied in Table VI. 
Table VII reports similar event studies to those in Table VI, but with one 
exception. The samples are based on firms subject to some form of 
shareholder activism announced on or after May 9, 2013, the date of the 
Wachtell Memorandum. Firms subject to activism before this date are 
included in Table VI but excluded from the analysis in Table VII. 
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Table VII: Companies Subject to Future Shareholder Activism 
 
 
Wachtell Memo 
(5/9/13) 
ISS Memo
(11/13/13) 
Provident Vote
(11/27/13) 
ISS FAQ 
(1/13/14) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Constant -0.000 0.002 0.013 -0.004  
 (0.972) (0.718) (0.143) (0.417)  
Proxy Fight -0.008 -0.004 0.017** 0.003  
 (0.247) (0.498) (0.025) (0.422)  
13D Filer -0.001 -0.005 0.019** 0.006  
 (0.905) (0.386) (0.036) (0.272)  
Exempt -0.001 -0.000 -0.010 0.003  
Solicitation (0.899) (0.963) (0.395) (0.608)  
Other 0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.000  
Campaign (0.554) (0.918) (0.822) (0.968)  
N 355 342 340 336  
R2 1.08% 0.62% 5.21% 0.81%  
 
In this table, in contrast to Table VI, the coefficient for Proxy Fight is 
negative but not significant in column 1, and there is no other statistically 
significant variable in the model. This means there is no statistically 
significant market reaction to the Wachtell Memorandum (column 1) for the 
subset of companies that experienced shareholder activism after the issuance 
of the memorandum. However, those companies that experienced shareholder 
activism after the issuance of the Wachtell Memorandum had a similar 
reaction to the  Provident vote (column 3); the variables Proxy Fight and 13D 
Filer are positive and significant at the 5% level. 
The implication of this finding is that the reaction to the Wachtell 
Memorandum appears to be concentrated in those firms that had already 
experienced shareholder activism----perhaps because the immediacy of 
such activism led the market to anticipate that those issuers were most 
likely to deploy the Wachtell Bylaw. In contrast, for those companies at 
which the market simply anticipated future activism, the Provident vote 
may have conveyed information not just about the availability of the 
golden leash but also about investors’ receptiveness to an activist event. 
In unreported results, we also examined the adopters and repealers of the 
Wachtell Bylaw set forth in Table IV using the same models as Table VII to 
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determine if the market reacted similarly. We found no significant results, 
implying that the market assigned different value effects to companies based 
on their susceptibility to shareholder activism. 
Finally, in Appendix A, we conducted a robustness check to further 
examine our initial findings about the wealth effects of the Wachtell Bylaw, 
the effect of ISS, and the announcement of the Provident results by 
performing a matched pair analysis—that is, examining the performance of 
similarly situated companies with and without shareholder activism. A 
matched pair analysis allowed us to perform a more precise comparison of 
how the market perceived the Wachtell Bylaw by eliminating variability due 
to differences in companies. 
Our findings are similar to (or perhaps even stronger than) our main 
results. In the matched pair analysis, we found that, as in Table VI, the 
coefficient for the variable Proxy Fight is negative and significant in column 
1 of Table A-I, indicating that firms that experienced a proxy fight or that 
were about to experience a proxy fight suffered negative returns relative to 
their matched firms that did not experience activism. As in Tables VI and 
VII, in column 3 the coefficients for the variables Proxy Fight and 13D Filer 
are positive and significant in both Tables A-I and A-II. However, in Table 
A-II the coefficient for Proxy Fight in column 1 is also negative and significant, 
implying that companies subject to future activism also experienced negative 
returns following the release of the Wachtell Memorandum. This finding 
suggests that the market may be anticipating the activist events at these firms 
and valuing the potential of a golden leash compensation arrangement in light 
of that anticipation. 
To summarize our empirical results as a whole, while we could not find a 
price reaction for those firms that did in fact adopt and repeal the Wachtell 
Bylaw—due perhaps, to the small number of firms involved—we did find 
evidence in our matched pair analysis of a statistically significant decrease in 
stock price on the date the Wachtell Bylaw became available to those firms 
that would later become targets of proxy fights (this evidence was contrary to our 
findings in Table VII which found that our results were driven by companies 
targeted for shareholder activism before the Wachtell Memorandum). Similarly, 
we found that the announcement of the Provident meeting vote was associated 
with a statistically significant increase in stock price for firms that would become 
targets of proxy fights as well as those firms that would be subject to 13D 
filings. We confirmed this finding in a matched pair analysis robustness check. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
Our core findings portray a complex and multidimensional view of 
corporate governance. Our analysis of the thirty-two adopters and repealers 
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does not identify a single factor explaining which companies adopted the 
Wachtell Bylaw. Our empirical analysis fails to demonstrate a price effect for 
those firms that adopted the Wachtell Bylaw. Nevertheless, we found 
evidence of a price impact in our analysis of a larger sample of those firms 
that were most likely to become the targets of future activism. The 
implications of these findings are presented in greater detail below. 
A. Governance Intermediaries and the Differential  
Pricing of Governance Terms 
In Section II.B above, we sketched the role of governance intermediaries 
in contemporary capital markets where large blocks of shares are held by 
predominantly passive institutional investors. Unlike disintermediated capital 
markets in which shareholders actively influence firms’ corporate governance 
choices through the collective pressure of their buy and sell decisions, in 
contemporary capital markets, governance intermediaries are indispensable 
agents of innovation and change. On the one hand, our findings support this 
account, demonstrating the significant influence enjoyed by both Wachtell 
and ISS, and highlighting areas in which their input is critically needed. On 
the other hand, our findings suggest a basis to criticize how governance 
intermediaries presently conduct this vital role. 
Our findings reveal the power of both Wachtell and ISS. On May 13, 2013, 
Wachtell made a public suggestion that was quickly adopted by thirty-two 
firms. Moreover, our findings show that the Wachtell recommendation 
influenced far more than the thirty-two firms that ultimately adopted the 
bylaw. Because the firm made its policy recommendation in the form of a 
bylaw that could be adopted by any firm at any time, the policy had an 
immediate market-wide effect, observable even in the share price of firms 
that had not adopted the bylaw. 
However, our findings show that the companies first adopting this bylaw 
did not appear to have a single or predictable rationale. Although many of the 
firms were subject to some type of activist interest, the company-specific 
response may also be explained by network effects or saliency in the market. 
Perhaps because of this, we did not find significant direct evidence of an 
immediate price effect associated with the adoption or repeal of the bylaw. 
Our findings show that ISS wields similar wide-ranging influence. Not 
only did its recommendation lead to a large number of withhold votes for 
Provident directors, its threat to make withhold recommendations against 
other firms that had adopted the Wachtell Bylaw led to widespread rescission 
of the bylaw. ISS’s threat also led to a statistically significant and economically 
meaningful increase in share price for those companies that seemed likely to 
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adopt the bylaw before the Provident vote but that now, following the threat, 
likely would not. 
With regard to ISS, our findings also support the view that investors do 
not treat everything ISS says with equal weight.166 We found no market 
reaction, for example, to the November 13, 2013 policy pronouncement 
concerning the Wachtell Bylaw that ISS made at the same time ISS issued its 
withhold recommendation for the upcoming Provident vote. Only on 
November 27, after 34% of shareholders voted to withhold their votes from 
the Provident board and ISS threatened withhold recommendations against 
all other directors who had adopted the Wachtell Bylaw, did the market give 
effect to the ISS position. Perhaps the initial ISS position did not move the 
market because the market was unable to gauge how seriously shareholders 
would take it. Once shareholders validated the ISS position by voting against 
the Provident board, the market accepted the ISS policy as a meaningful 
constraint on the Wachtell Bylaw. It is not just what ISS says, in other words, 
that moves the market. It is when the market believes ISS has credible 
influence with investors—that is, when investors have demonstrated a 
willingness to incorporate the ISS position into their voting decisions. 
Perhaps most interesting is the way in which these intermediaries 
interacted to provoke governance reform. The case of the golden leash 
presents an activist invention (the golden leash), which provoked a corporatist 
response (the Wachtell Bylaw), which in turn provoked a proxy advisory 
recommendation, followed by a demonstration by institutional investors that 
they took the recommendation seriously (the Provident vote). But these 
roles may be interchangeable. There is no reason, for example, that the 
corporatist intervention could not come first, as indeed it did with respect to 
fee-shifting bylaws. In that context, following a decision of the Delaware 
Supreme Court that seemed to authorize fee-shifting,167 a group of important 
corporate law firms—notably, excluding Wachtell—publicly recommended 
that corporations adopt fee-shifting bylaws.168 ISS subsequently took a 
position against the bylaw provisions.169 Before the issue could be decided by 
governance intermediaries, however, the Delaware legislature banned the 
adoption of fee-shifting bylaws.170 
 
166 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
167 ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 559-60 (Del. 2014). 
168 See Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting 
the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2015). 
169 ISS, UNITED STATES PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES UPDATES: 2015 BENCHMARK 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 3, 6-7 (2014). 
170 See S.B. 75, 148th Gen. Assemb., Sec. 2 (Del. 2015), http://legis.delaware.gov/LIS/lis148. 
nsf/vwLegislation/SB+75/$file/legis.html?open [http://perma.cc/CSD2-2E74]. 
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Aside from demonstrating their influence and importance, our findings 
also pose a challenge for governance intermediaries. Presently, governance 
intermediaries offer market-wide pronouncements. Wachtell, for example, 
inveighs against activism in all of its forms, and ISS, for its part, applies its 
governance policies on a marketwide basis.171 Yet our findings suggest that 
one size does not fit all when it comes to corporate governance. Rather, if 
markets and companies react heterogeneously to corporate governance terms, 
the claim that a particular governance term is universally harmful (or 
beneficial) to shareholders is suspect, and governance intermediaries’ 
marketwide pronouncements to that effect are likely untrue. 
Ultimately, our study supports the proposition that corporate governance 
should be decided on a firm-by-firm basis. Governance intermediaries should not 
make claims about the universal merits or deficiencies of specific governance 
provisions or structures, but instead should evaluate the needs of particular 
firms. Firms, for their part, should engage with governance intermediaries to 
explain their specific circumstances and demonstrate how their governance 
structure is responsive to those circumstances. Moreover, firms should assess 
the impact of governance terms and perhaps adopt them, not in response to 
governance intermediaries, but based on their relevance to value creation. 
B. Price Discrimination in the Market for Governance Terms 
While we did find evidence for skepticism that companies are correctly 
adopting corporate governance terms, we also found evidence that the market 
is reacting to these terms. For the broader sample we observed a statistically 
significant price effect. Our results thus provide some measure of evidence 
supporting a key pillar of corporate law theory—at least since Easterbrook 
and Fischel—that the market prices governance terms.172 
A more interesting implication of our study, however, lies not in what it 
says about whether the market prices governance terms, but in what it shows 
us about how the market prices governance. Different firms, we found, reacted 
differently.173 Much of the literature discussed above assumes, for example, 
that separation of the chairman and CEO roles or adoption or repeal of a 
staggered board provision will have much the same effect across all firms in the 
market.174 Our study suggests a contrary conclusion: that governance provisions 
have heterogeneous effects depending upon firm-specific characteristics and 
 
171 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
172 See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
174 See James A. Brickley et al., Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the 
Board, 3 J. CORP. FIN. 189 (1997) (conducting an identical analysis on a set of companies to examine 
the pros and cons of separating the CEO and Chairmanship role). 
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investor perception of those characteristics. It offers evidence that in pricing 
governance terms, investors may focus on those firms most clearly affected by 
the relevant provision. In our case, protections against activism matter most 
for firms that investors perceive as likely to be subject to activism, where that 
perception may be based on recent or anticipated activist activity.   
We hesitate to accord great weight to our general pricing conclusions 
because our study is confined to only one provision in a small subsample of 
companies. Still, our research both supports existing corporate law theory and 
provides a basis for further research. 
Our fundamental finding is that the market reacted to the availability of 
the golden leash specifically at those companies that were most likely to 
experience shareholder activism. This suggests that the market both values 
and prices governance changes. Our finding that this price effect is limited to 
potential activist targets, however, raises a broader concern. If investors do 
not respond to a governance innovation unless and until its effect on a specific 
firm is both salient and foreseeable, managers may get a free pass for adopting 
terms that, on a clear day, are viewed as economically insignificant, but that 
ultimately prove harmful to shareholders. 
C. Activism 
We found a statistically significant and economically important negative 
price reaction to the Wachtell Bylaw. When the Bylaw was first made available, 
the price of those firms most likely to implement it declined by 0.8%.175 And 
when significant obstacles arose to the adoption of the Wachtell Bylaw, the 
price of those firms most affected increased by over 1%.176 What are we to 
make of the dim view the market seems to take of the Wachtell Bylaw? 
One possibility is that the market seems to have a generally favorable view 
of activists, and is skeptical of tools that weaken them. The Wachtell Bylaw 
is, as we have shown, a protective measure against a specific activist tactic—
namely, the golden leash. It takes away the power to offer special compensation 
arrangements to director nominees, a power that may be useful to activists 
challenging recalcitrant boards. As such, the Wachtell Bylaw may be viewed 
as a board entrenchment tool. The market’s consistently negative response to 
it may be seen as a vote in favor of activism and against entrenchment. 
But does the market’s apparently favorable view of activism imply that 
activism is socially desirable? Our results do not address this question. All 
participants in the debate over activism agree that activist interventions 
 
175 See supra Table VI, Column 1. 
176 See supra Table VI, Column 3 (showing a 1.6% increase in price for firms subject to proxy 
fights and a 1.9% increase for firms subject to a 13D filing). 
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typically lead to at least a short-term increase in share price.177 The debate is 
largely over whether this short-term increase in share price is associated with 
a longer-term increase in firm value or if, instead, a short-term reshuffling of the 
business that tends to jeopardize the long-term health of the firm. The debate, 
in other words, cannot be settled by reference to short-term price effects. 
Because the debate over the social value of activism takes a longer-term view, 
our findings cannot and do not address it, and thus cannot assess the social 
utility of golden leashes. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has presented the golden leash compensation arrangement 
and the bylaw proposed in response to it as a case study of corporate 
governance innovation in contemporary capital markets. It demonstrates the 
crucial role played by governance intermediaries—here, law firms and proxy 
advisors—and documents the role of each in transmitting governance 
information to the market. Our pricing study shows evidence that share 
prices reacted to the availability of the golden leash, but primarily at firms 
that investors perceived as activist targets. Moreover, share prices reacted to 
the actions of key intermediaries, rather than firm-specific adoptions or 
repeals. These findings portray a complex picture of corporate governance 
that is, in some ways, contrary to traditional notions. Governance innovations 
appear to be filtered through intermediaries that advocate for governance 
provisions without necessarily considering their effects on a company-by-
company basis. Meanwhile, markets seem to pay limited attention to 
governance innovations that are not viewed as having an immediate payoff. 
All of this has important implications for the literature on the price effects 
of corporate governance terms, the proper role of governance intermediaries, 
and the ongoing academic debate over shareholder activism. In particular, 
investors should be skeptical of the sweeping claims of governance 
intermediaries, and boards should work harder to explain their firm-specific 
needs both to governance intermediaries and to their shareholder base. Our 
findings also demonstrate some basis for skepticism of empirical studies that 
make broad claims about wealth effects that may result from the adoption or 
repeal of corporate governance provisions. 
  
 
177 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1085, 1087-89 (2015) (reviewing the literature on shareholder activism and noting the general 
agreement as to short term gains which typically result from such activism); Alon Brav et al., Hedge 
Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 4 J. FIN. 1729, 1756 (2006) (finding short 
term abnormal returns surrounding the period of announcement). 
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APPENDIX—MATCHED PAIR ANALYSIS 
In this appendix we examined our initial findings about the wealth effects 
of the Wachtell Bylaw, the effect of ISS, and the announcement of the 
Provident results by performing a matched pair analysis—that is, by 
examining the performance of similarly situated companies with and without 
shareholder activism. A matched pair analysis allows us to perform a more 
precise comparison of how the market perceived the Wachtell Bylaw by 
eliminating variability due to differences in companies. Table A-I reports the 
results of this analysis for all of the companies in our sample. 
 
Table A-I: Companies Subject to Shareholder Activism,  
Plus Matched Sample of Non-Activism Firms178 
 
 
Wachtell Memo 
(5/9/13) 
ISS Memo
(11/13/13) 
Provident Vote
(11/27/13) 
ISS FAQ 
(1/13/14) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Constant 0.001 0.004** 0.017*** 0.001  
 (0.435) (0.011) (0.000) (0.298)  
Proxy Fight -0.006* -0.001 0.014* -0.001  
 (0.083) (0.789) (0.053) (0.727)  
13D Filer -0.002 -0.005 0.015* 0.003  
 (0.640) (0.278) (0.076) (0.478)  
Exempt -0.000 -0.001 -0.013 -0.002  
Solicitation (0.987) (0.923) (0.199) (0.614)  
Other 0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002  
Campaign (0.313) (0.472) (0.472) (0.280)  
N 972 924 919 913  
R2 0.42% 0.19% 1.03% 0.24%  
         
We again examined each of the four dates analyzed in Tables VI and VII. 
The dependent variable in each model is the firm’s excess stock return on the 
given date. Independent variables are 0/1 binary indicators of whether a firm 
was subject to the given type of shareholder activism from May 8, 2012 (one 
 
178 Variables are as defined supra note 162. P-values are in parentheses with ***, **, and * 
representing statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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year prior to the Wachtell Memorandum) through November 25, 2014 (the 
day before the release of the ISS recommendation). 
Each column adds a matched sample of firms that were not subject to 
shareholder activism since 2009. Matching firms are based on the closest 
equity market capitalization of a firm in the same two-digit SIC code on April 
8, 2013 (one month prior to the Wachtell Memorandum). Activism firms 
and/or their matching firms are not replaced if one is delisted after the first 
event study date. 
Similar to our findings in Table VI, the coefficient for the variable Proxy 
Fight is negative and significant in column 1 of Table A-I, indicating that 
firms that experienced a proxy fight or that were about to experience a proxy 
fight suffered negative returns relative to their matched firms that did not 
experience activism. Again, in column 3 the coefficients for the variables 
Proxy Fight and 13D File are positive and significant as in Table VI above. 
To test the robustness of these findings, in Table A-II we perform a 
matched pair analysis for companies subject to activism after to the issuance 
of the Wachtell Memorandum. 
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Table A-II: Companies Subject to Future Shareholder Activism, Plus Matched 
Sample of Non-Activism Firms179 
 
 
Wachtell Memo 
(5/9/13) 
ISS Memo
(11/13/13) 
Provident Vote
(11/27/13) 
ISS FAQ 
(1/13/14) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Constant 0.001 0.005** 0.017*** 0.001  
 (0.487) (0.011) (0.000) (0.399)  
Proxy Fight -0.009* -0.005 0.015** 0.000  
 (0.082) (0.270) (0.016) (0.913)  
13D Filer -0.002 -0.007 0.016** 0.002  
 (0.673) (0.141) (0.019) (0.682)  
Exempt -0.003 -0.003 -0.013 -0.001  
Solicitation (0.704) (0.687) (0.154) (0.783)  
Other 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004*  
Campaign (0.366) (0.568) (0.207) (0.056)  
N 710 682 679 674  
R2 0.58% 0.54% 2.31% 0.59%  
 
Our results mirror those found in Table A-I. As with Table VII, the 
implication of this finding is that our results in Table A-II are being driven 
predominantly by companies that experienced shareholder activism after the 
issuance of the Wachtell Memorandum. 
 
179 Variables are as defined supra note 162. P-values are in parentheses with ***, **, and * 
representing statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
